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ABSTRACT
The Culture of Revolution: Revolutionary
Transformation in Iran
by
Autoosa Elizabeth Kojoori-Saatchi
Dr. Mehran Tamadonfar, Thesis Examination Chair
Professor of Political Science
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
The current challenges to the authority of the Islamic Republic and mass
demonstrations in opposition to the presidential elections of 2009 in Iran, have raised the
specter of another revolution in the country. In the 20th century, the country underwent
two major revolutions: the Constitutional revolution during the first decade of the century
and the Islamic revolution in the late 1970s. In this thesis, I will examine why revolutions
occur in Iran with greater frequency than other societies. By relying on a historiography
and contemporary empirical evidence, I will explore the cultural underpinnings of the
Iranian revolutionary worldview embedded in its long history of monarchism, combined
with the Shi’a sense of political activism tied to a cultural sense of justice, fairness, and
rejection of oppression.
To many, the question is not whether or not Iran will experience another revolution. It
is rather when that transformation will occur. In this thesis, I will argue that mass
mobilization, especially in response to political opposition to injustice, is a common
cultural feature of Iranians. Thus, one may very well expect that the current public
reactions to the regime will most likely result in another revolution, marking the end of
the Islamic republic in light of its repressive policies.
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This study, in contrast to earlier examinations of political transformation in Iran, is
largely focused on the cultural explanations rather than institutional and external
dynamics. It will, hopefully, provide an insight into the dynamics of change in
undemocratic developing systems in search of indigenous models of development.
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INTRODUCTION
As a growing power in the Middle East, it is extremely hard to ignore the future path
of the Islamic Republic of Iran; therefore it is particularly helpful to recognize the
prospects of revolutionary change in a nation that appears to influence the politics of
many countries within the region. Uncovering potential regime disturbances in Iran can
help better predict systemic changes in nations heavily dependant on the politics of the
Islamic Republic. Iran has the potential to prop up or destabilize surrounding nations
therefore understanding the regime and its future is essential to uncovering the future of
the region.
Over the past few months interest in Iran has increased as a result of recent election
disputes that have guided the rise of the so called “green movement”. Some believe the
green movement is proof that another Iranian revolution is on the horizon; however
others question the capacity of such a movement when taking into consideration the
strength of Iran’s revolutionary guards. It is extremely important to understand why
scholars are hypothesizing revolutionary transformation as a probable mechanism to
change rather than less radical institutional alterations. Can Iranians possibly have a
cultural inclination to revolt? If two revolutions in the past century are not adequate proof
of this propensity to revolt then; massive uprisings caused by the recent presidential
election further provides evidence that Iranians are accustomed to reacting to perceived
injustices through revolutionary behavior.
It appears that for the people of Iran, protest based behavior has become the standard
method of responding to rising political expectations and political injustice. The
constitutional revolution of 1906 proved that Iranians were ready to end the absolutist
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monarchy and establish a constitution that could limit the power of the monarchy. The
1979 revolution proved that Iranians were tired of the Shah’s policies and corruption in
the monarchic system. Both of these revolutions are proof that Iranians chose
revolutionary transformation through mass mobilization instead of simply accepting such
frustration with the system.
This thesis utilizes a cultural approach to explain the motives that drive this
revolutionary behavior. Iran has encountered economic instability, uneven social and
economic development, and various other issues that can not be fully explained through
simple economic or structural-based approaches. There is clearly some other variable that
is promoting such wide scale mass mobilization among the Iranian people that has yet to
be uncovered in the political science literature. I believe the key to understanding why the
Iranian masses have mobilized so often in the last century is found through careful
analysis of Iran’s political culture. By utilizing a cultural approach one can prove that;
although economic factors played an important role in both revolutions that Iranians
accepted this type of behavior as means to voicing their frustration with a system that
appeared to be failing the Iranian masses.
Political cultural values vary according to the environment that surrounds the
population being studied (Hitchner, 1968). This particular approach is essential to
understanding a unique element of political such as revolution that appears to occur more
often within a specific nation. Political culture is the values that guide and operate the
political system. These values are particularly important in the case of Iran because of the
unquestionable influence that religion and particular Zoroastrianism and Shi’ism has in
the Iranian political system. Political-cultural theory is different and probably more
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applicable to revolutionary behavior because it not only focuses on the cultural values
that shape the political system but also the behaviors motivated by such values (Thomas,
Ellis, Wildavsky, 1990).
To better understand the significance of the theory utilized to explain this Iranian
inclination to revolt, it is best to begin by thoroughly conceptualizing the terms; political
culture and revolution. Although culture is typically used in loose terms to explain the
social responses of a set of people (Malinowski 1944, p. 36), this thesis further expands
on the term to show that culture is far more detailed than most scholars believe it to be.
By over simplifying political culture, some scholars have changed the term into a vague
and nearly immeasurable concept (Wildavsky, Ellis, 1997).
Revolutions are generally considered to be immense transformations that essentially
alter the major components of the system from one type to another. In the case of Iran
both the constitutional revolution and the 1979 revolution resulted in key transformations
in the political system. Since revolutions are comprised of large scale uprising, studying
this behavior in terms of political culture is extremely important.
The recent election dilemma that sparked unrest among the Iranian people has
certainly illuminated the prospects of a future revolution in Iran1 .Growing frustration
among the Iranian masses could perhaps result in a movement that even the
Revolutionary Guard can not prevent. This thesis focuses on the dynamics that suggest
that revolutionary change is essentially built into the political culture of the Iranian
people and that, given the current situation in Iran, such a culture will inevitably result in
a future revolution. I believe that if the current pattern of repression continues, it is very
1

A dispute in regards to the legitimacy of the 2009 presidential elections led to large scale protests in the
major cities of Iran. Reformist believed that Ahmadinejad lost the election and that the government
falsified votes in order to reelect Ahmadinejad.
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possible that we will see small movements like the one initiated during the presidential
elections of 2009 expand into much larger and more organized oppositional groups.
Revolutionary transformation is a form of political change that rarely occurs within
nations. The reason that such a change has occurred twice in the last century for Iranians
is because they have a culture based on revolutionary values. This culture is shaped by
not only their religion that promotes resistance to injustice but also their nationalist
ideology that is rooted in the long and influential history of the Iranian kingship. Iran’s
long history and its transition to Islam has created a set of values that has encouraged not
only a strong civil society but also population that is willing to sacrifice a lot for political
justice. Thousands of years of history as a largely Zoroastrian nation centered on the
Iranian kingship has encouraged a pride among Iranians that simply can not be
overlooked. A combination of the pride resulting from the nation’s history as a leading
empire and its resentment for all things Arab in origin pushed Iranians to adopt a religion
that not only enabled the nations’ historic kingship to continue but also show that Iranians
have a different way of doing things. Throughout this thesis I will explain why culture is
essential to understanding revolutionary behavior and why Iranians appear to have a
revolutionary culture that will eventually lead to yet another revolution in the future.
Chapter one begins by revealing the reason why a cultural approach is suitable for
explaining revolutionary behavior. Throughout this section the focus will be to
conceptualize revolution by providing various explanations of the term, how different
scholars believe revolutions occur and which theories appear to be the most plausible.
The second half of the chapter will focus on conceptualizing culture through an
anthropological perceptive and providing various definitions of the term as described by
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social science scholars. In this section, the focus will also be to explain why it is
important to utilize a broader definition of culture and how the term relates to politics.
The role that norms and values play in shaping perceptions toward leadership, regime
type, institutions, political participation and various dynamics relating to politics will also
be discussed. Various classical and post Marxist theories of revolution and the obstacles
these theories face in explaining revolution in Iran will be revealed to explain why these
theories are generally unable to explain revolutions that are not strictly economic based.
It is important to then explain structural and culture based approaches revolution as well
as some perceived issues with past theories and how to overcome them. The remainder of
the chapter will clarify the political-cultural approach to revolution and why this method
appears to work best in explaining revolutionary transformation in Iran.
Chapter two will uncover the dynamics that are the foundation of Iran’s
revolutionary behavior. This chapter will be centered on explaining how the combination
of Iran’s ancient monarchic system, Zoroastrianism and Shi’ism has led to a nationalist
ideology that essentially encourages revolutionary behavior. This chapter will be focused
on how Iran transformed from a Zoroastrian nation to a Shia nation in order to maintain
Iran’s historic monarchic system of leadership; and why this transformation was essential
for the nation’s autonomy. The chapter will also focus on how Shi’ism in Iran has
changed in order to more properly reflect the values of the population.
Chapter three will discuss political movements such as uprising that paved the way
for the constitutional revolution of 1905 and the revolution of 1979. This chapter will
focus on why such movements occurred, what they intended to achieve and how the
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changed the political system in Iran. The focus will be to show how protests and
rebellions eventually led to the Iranian revolution of 1979.
Chapter four will focus strictly on the 1979 revolution and the dynamics that enabled
such a large scale movement to occur by discussing how the absolutist nature of the
monarchy resulted in bad social and economic policies, which eventually led to mass
mobilization. This chapter will center on how the development of civil society in Iran
enabled public mobilization and the role that Shi’ism played in strengthening civil
society. Also it will focus on the roots of the revolution by explaining how the Shah’s
policies caused alienation, lack of cooptation, class concerns and economic issues shaped
through cultural factors.
Chapter five will discuss the future and the potentials of revolution in Iran. This
chapter will explain how the spiritual elements of the Islamic regime has become
marginalized by those in power and why this has become a major concern for the Iranian
people. The focus of this chapter will be to explain how the separation between the
political and spiritual is changing the way Iranians feel about the Islamic leadership
structure, and why change will either come via major institutional alterations or through
revolutionary transformation.
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CHAPTER 1
POLITICAL CULTURE AND REVOLUTION:
A CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL
ASSESMENT
Why do some nations go through revolutionary transformations while others do not?
Theories of revolutions have evolved from economic methods of analysis such as Marxist
based speculations to more detailed theoretical models such as Dependency and World
Systems. Although such theories have appeared to work in generally explaining
revolutionary outcomes, they fail to properly explain the diverse roots of many past
revolutions. The last Iranian revolution was not strictly a response to economic factors,
the revolution was far more detailed than most accounts suggest. Iran’s last revolution
was the result of political injustice, economic inequality, cultural imperialism, women’s
rights, religious revival and various other dynamics (Nikki Keddie, 1981). Revolutions
are hardly geared toward one particular outcome as some would like to believe.2 The
Iranian revolution of 1979 is a prime example of how various groups can organize within
a repressive regime to overthrow the leadership and transform the institutions within the
system.
Conceptualizing Revolution
A revolution is defined by Goldstone (2003, p. 38) as “… a rapid fundamental, and
violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political
institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies”.

2

The Iranian revolution can be considered in part as a form of Shia revivalism brought on by policies of
secularization such as the White revolution. It can also be viewed as a means to attaining women’s rights as
many Iranian women took to the streets to show their anger with a nation that showed little regard for
women’s rights in regards to marriage, property, jobs etc.
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Revolutions have also been defined in broader terms by scholars such as Bauer as simply
social changes that are sometimes successful, often fail, but includes some form of
intrusive violence in civil culture that involves the most “basic level of man’s communal
existence”(Johnson 1982). I look at revolutions as large scale alterations to the system
through massive uprising triggered by various factors such as poor leadership, bad
economic conditions and social stratification. By poor leadership I mean that the
leadership has either lost control of its people or instead become too controlling and
oppressive to the masses. Clearly such leadership issues can be the result of numerous
factors in which I will discuss more thoroughly throughout this work but the main point
to take away from this discussion is that revolutions are a fairly new phenomenon that
involves considerable discontent with the system, violence, desire for change, poor
leadership and of course mass mobilization on behalf of the oppressed people and
eventually leadership failure which leads to an immense social and institutional change.
In the field of political science the term revolution is much more than just simply a
change of great magnitude. The term represents political transformations such as the ones
that occurred in France, Iran, Russia, China, Cuba and Algeria. that could easily be
distinguished from the unsuccessful non-revolutionary changes that previously took place
in those nations. Revolutions are violent because previous non violent methods to change
are generally not successful in implementing the changes necessary by the masses. Such
movements can not be characterized by just a list of causes and effects as scholars like
Gottschalk (1944) have tried to formulate. They are unique to each nation and society and
necessitate more in depth psycho-social analysis to uncover the rationale for such
movements. When studying revolutions, we must look at the social interdependence of
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man through understanding the maintenance of “order and stability” (Johnson 1982, p. 4).
The act of maintaining stability is clearly different among various societies which is why
it is important to look to the political cultural values within a society to uncover the
dynamics that cause such behavior.
Revolutions in Theoretical Perspectives
The Radical Perspective
Classical approaches to explaining revolutions such Marxian models look to class
consciousness as the basis for revolution. Marx believed that the “urban proletariat” (
Jack A.Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr and Farrokh Moshiri, 1991, p. 9) would eventually
become alienated through capitalist modes of production and realize, or become
conscious, of this alienation and eventually revolt. Marx thought that revolution was
strictly the outcome of this alienation brought on by capitalist modes of productions and
that other working class members of society would be “nonrevolutionary” (p. 9).
If alienation of the proletariat advances to class consciousness and ultimately
revolution as Marx would like us to believe, then why have such Marxist revolutions not
occurred more often? In studying Marxist approaches to revolution it becomes apparent
that economic based class consciousness is not necessarily adequate enough to cause
revolutionary transformation in all nations.3 Through his distinction of town and country
Marx neglected the probability of peasant revolts (p .9) but more important he completely
overlooked the possibility of urban middle class revolts. Probably the most ironic part to
Marx’s theory of revolution is that most revolutions have not taken place in advanced
capitalist countries as he had predicted; instead such Marxist revolutions have transpired

3

Revolutions have taken place in underdeveloped segments of the world (i.e Russia, Cuba, Iran, Algeria
etc) or prior to development, not highly advanced capitalist nations as he had predicted.
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in more underdeveloped parts of the world such as China, Cuba and Russia (Goldstone,
p. 183).Although much of Marx’s predictions in regards to revolution have been
somewhat erroneous, his general speculation regarding alienation and class consciousness
can be rather valuable (as will be revealed in the latter portion of this chapter) in
explaining revolutionary transformation.
Post Marxist Approaches
Post Marxist based approaches essentially use the Marxian model; however they
utilize different operational definitions than the classic approach and apply the basic
principles of the theory (class struggle, exploitation, alienation, class consciousness and
revolution) to different degrees (Cohan 1975, p. 59). Such models include systems based
theories such as that of Galtung (1974), Wallerstein (2004), Amin (1982) and Dunn
(1989) that employ a larger level of analysis than classical Marxist theories but continue
to apply Marxist principles to the case studies. 4
World-system theorists attempt to explain inequality in the global system as an
outcome of bourgeoisie, core, state policies that impair periphery state growth. They
argue that core states exploit periphery states for raw materials such as natural resources
or labor by unilaterally establishing their prices in the global system. According to such
scholars, periphery states are forced to export only materials desired by the core at prices
also established by the core. Because of product specialization, periphery states become
unstable when global demand for their exports decline. Therefore, the internal dynamics
of periphery states are directly affected by the global fluctuation of demand through

4

Marx’s theory of revolution focused on the interaction between society and the state whereas systems
based theories use a macro level of analysis and apply the basic Marxist principles of revolution
(exploitation, alienation, class consciousness) to the interaction of states rather than varying classes in a
particular society.
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policies that become more repressive with declining demand. Export diversification could
empower periphery states to become more internally stable, however core states prohibit
such reform by sustaining repression.
Nations considered part of the core are typically nations that developed during the
period of industrialization. Core states are able to structurally develop by weakening
other states through military force, invoking either full phased colonization or cultural/
economic imperialism (Shahid Alam, 2006). Degrees of imperialism vary with time,
however the initial phase of imperialism can be characterized as physical occupation
through colonization. According to such theorist; the second and most common phase of
imperialism is achieved by utilizing international organizations as a means to restrain
development (structural/economic) in periphery States. Colonizers are empowered with
the ability to set the terms of production by either physically or fiscally influencing the
periphery. They typically assign leaders within the periphery states to manage instead.
Leaders of periphery states therefore become the “core” within the periphery that benefit
from the imperialist policies of core states.5 Periphery states are those that are structurally
weak and undeveloped in relation to core states and are typically selected on the basis of
orientalist features such as culture, race, and religion (Immanuel Wallerstein, 1982).
Nearly all world-system scholars agree that periphery states are colonized with the
certainty that citizens of periphery states are racially, culturally or religiously inferior to
those of the core states, or as Wallerstein (1982) claims a partition between white and
nonwhite actors. Orientalist convictions enable core states to dominate periphery nations
5

Wallerstein argues that “core states keep periphery states weak enough that the peripheral states
don’t have the power to set the terms of the flow of factors of productions, yet strong enough to guarantee
this flow against interference of local potentates or the resistance of the local work force” (Amin, Arrighi,
Gunder Frank, Wallerstein, 1982,p. 26).
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with the assumption that such control is necessary in order to stabilize the global
economy.
Structural/Functionalism (Parsons, Johnsons, Skopcol)
Funcitionalist scholars such as Parsons (1967) and Johnson (1982) believe that
society can indeed be conflictual but they argue that such class conflict is simply the
result of a natural resource allocation problem (Cohan 1975, p. 120). Such theorists are
more concerned with how conflict is contained because they simplify the cause of
conflict to merely an issue of resource scarcity and avoid further discussion of other
potential causes. Johnson believes that conflict is contained because groups are able to
minimize differences through socially agreeable solutions (p. 121). Johnson also argues
that values must be adjusted to gain equilibrium through a process of evolution. He
believes that if people’s values are not adjusted through evolution then a revolution will
have to result to restore the equilibrium. From a functionalist perspective there will be no
movement toward communist society, instead the people will redefine their roles and
statutes in terms of the new social values that more properly represent the environment
(Cohan, p.125). In the end scholars such as Johnson (1982) believe that revolution is not
the preferred method and certainly not the way to go to achieve change, therefore
evolution is the way to go to achieve equilibrium and stabilize society.
The problem with functionalist theories of revolution is rooted in the
oversimplification of the foundations of revolutionary behavior. Functionalists reduce the
cause of revolution down to simply a matter of resource scarcity. Although resource
allocation has been partly responsible for almost all past revolutions, it has not been the
main and only cause of systemic transformation. Revolutions are multifaceted and must
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be studied as such. It is simply not possible to generalize all revolutionary behavior in
terms of resource scarcity.
Cultural Politics
Cultural theorists such as Pye (1991), Rosenbaum (1975) and Wildavsky (1997) look
to the cultural factors that lead to political actions rather than institutions or the structure
of society to explain a type of political behavior. Such theorist use a more
comprehensive approach to explaining revolution because they believe its impossible to
look merely at the structure of the political/ economic system to explain revolutionary
transformation when so many other psychological factors are at play. Or as Hitchner says
“Political Systems are always part of a larger environment, shaped and influenced by a
broad context of forces, historical, social, philosophical, and psychological” (1968, p.
553). To understand the politics within a nation we must also comprehend the elements
that influence it. Although there is little literature on political culture and revolutionary
behavior it is imperative to provide the fundamentals of the theory to later show how this
material will be synthesized into a more comprehensive approach to explaining
revolutionary behavior.
Conceptualizing Culture
To understand political-cultural theory one must first understand the term culture and
the dynamics that are contained within the phrase. First, it is important to realize that
culture is a vital and fundamental dynamic of society and that it”… matters extrinsically
for outcomes” (Jan-Eric Lane, Svante O. Ersson 2005, p. 42). Culture guides the decision
making process within a group and is relevant outside of the culture itself in determining
how the group will react certain phenomenon’s. Culture involves ethnicity, religion and
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heritage and provides universal values for individuals within a group. Lane and Errson
(2005, p. 23) say that culture is a “…total body of beliefs, behaviors, knowledge,
sanctions, values and goals that marks the way of life of any people”. It is sociopsychological phenomenon that is formed through human interaction and therefore exists
among all groups (Micheal Thompson, Richard Ellis,Aaron B. Wildavsky 1990, p. 49).
Equally important to understand is that cultures can be distinguished by themes that guide
them.6 One can also view culture as a secondary environment created by individuals as a
response to their social and physical environment (Bronislaw Malinowski 1944, p. 36).
The theory of culture focuses on why groups want what they want and how such
collectivities go about getting what they want (Thompson, Ellis, Wildavsky 1990, p 97).
If for instance a group wants peace, how will they go about attaining peace? Will they
rebel, revolt or kill to achieve peace? Every culture has a different set of values that
guides their decision making; therefore we must comprehend these values in order to
understand how they will react to various political circumstances such as repression.
Culture is comprised of the history preceding a group of people, the language that
dictates the verbiage they use, the religion that guides their system of morality and the
physical environment that they live in. Without culture individuals would have little
guidance in life and be forced to make decisions based their own understanding rather
than that of individuals within society that have already experienced such circumstances.
Culture allows individuals to save time by adhering to socially accepted patterns of
decisions making to guide their everyday lives, it simply makes life easier, and can
viewed as a guide book to living within a society.

6

Different cultures have varying themes. By themes I mean elements found within the culture that appear
to dominate the tone of the culture ( i.e. freedom, rebellion, capitalism etc.).
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Defining Political Culture
The study of culture only became part of political science in the behavioralist era of
the 1950’s-1960’s (Wildavsky 1998). During that time, political scientist slowly moved
away from focusing on the role of formal institutions to studying the informal behavior
that were essentially said to be the moral fiber of such institutions. Wildavsky (1998 p.
1) claims that there are over 164 definitions for the term culture and that the dynamics
that relate all these definitions together are that culture is a system of “values, beliefs,
norms and assumptions”. To condense this lengthy argument of which definition is most
suitable, I provide the definitions that appear most often within the political science
literature to demonstrate that although there are various definitions for the concept, they
are essentially based upon the same fundamental dynamics stated above.
Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba define political culture as “…specifically political
orientations and attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes
toward the role of the self in the system” (1989, p. 12). They also define in terms of a
“…set of orientations toward a specific set of social objects and processes” (p. 12).
Rosenbaum (1963, p. 4) defines political culture as the orientations in which a person or
group holds in regards to the fundamental elements of the political system, or if using a
larger level of analysis; the way in which the masses evaluate and respond to their
political officials and institutions (p.4). Ross (Lichbach, Zuckerman 1997, p. 42)
provides a far broader definition in his chapter on political culture and begins with a
definition of culture as “…a system of meaning that people use to mange their daily
worlds” and as “…the basis of social identity that affects how people line up and how
they act in a wide range of matters”.
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Almond and Verba (1989, pp. 30-31) argue that political culture is the variable most
often omitted that links both macro and micro politics together. They argue that micro
levels of analysis are crucial for understanding the behavior of the group or macro level
analysis (1980, pp. 30-31). Rosenbaum attempts to distinguish the two levels of analysis
to provide two different definitions for the term political culture but Almond and Verba
clearly explain how political culture can only be studied through a synthesis of both
micro and macro level analysis. 7 According to Rosenbaum (1963) political cultural
orientations can be divided into the three groups “Orientations toward government
structures”, “Orientations toward others in the political System” (p. 7), and Orientations
towards one’s own political activity” (p. 7). Political culture is more than just how one
acts politically it is how one evaluates the particular regime in which they live within,
how they react to government inputs and outputs, the political identification one chooses,
the amount of trust an individual has towards others in society, the preference of rules
one wishes to follow, one’s political competence in addition to one’s feeling of political
efficacy (Rosenbaum, p. 7).
I define political culture as the collective behavior in which a group has in regards to
and in response to the political system. This behavior is shaped by many factors such as
values, history, language, religion and physical environment. I agree with Almond and
Verba (1989) that the individual level of analysis is important for studying political
culture and that the singular persons behaviors and the groups can not be studied
separately. I believe this is simply because individuals constitute the group and in order
to uncover patterns and build generalizations about a population we must first understand
7

Almond and Verba (1989) are correct in arguing that individual level of analysis, personalities of
individuals etc. are necessary for understand macro or group level behavior of a society. They also argue
however that this synthesis has been rarely achieved in political cultural literature (p. 31).
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the behavior of the individuals within that population. Knowing the values and norms of
individuals within a nation will allow us to understand what political issues are important
to them and why. Such analysis enables us to see why societies behave in a particular
way when situations surrounding a political phenomenon such as revolution are relatively
similar. Political-cultural analysis enables us to build a clearer picture of a group or
society within a nation and permits us to uncover the motive for certain behaviors that are
only partially explained with preceding theories of revolution. By centering the majority
of such research on widely held orientations within a society we can uncover patterns that
will help us calculate how such group will behave in various circumstances. Political
culture can be viewed as the glue that can either retain or disable an entire political
system. Cultural theory focuses on who a person is, and what they will do and how they
will react in certain politically heated situations rather than just assuming institutions
implement the rules for such circumstances.
Political Culture and Political Behavior
Cultural approaches are especially useful in explaining phenomenons such as
revolution because revolutions consist of large groups of people, behaving in a specific
way to transform the system. Why do some groups revolt in repressive systems while
others do not? Why do some nations go through a pattern of massive uprising while in
bad economic conditions while other nations in the same or even worse economic
conditions do not? Cultural theory allows us to uncover the answers to these questions in
which most other economic and structure based theories can only partially explain. By
applying a political cultural approach to revolution we can uncover how economic, social
and political issues are shaped by the history, religion, language and physical
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environment of the people. Such analysis enables us to see various dimensions of
revolutionary behavior that have been generally absent in past theories o revolution. 8
In this thesis, political cultural and psychological theories are used in unison with
basic Marxist principles (similar to that Pierre Bouridue’s work) to explain a number of
different factors that cause revolutionary behavior. By looking at the four sub categories
of psychological approaches to revolution (Cohan, 1975), I provide a broader, more
comprehensive explanation of revolutionary behavior.9 It is incredibly important to use a
comprehensive approach to explaining revolutionary behavior because as mentioned
before, revolutions are complex phenomenons. People revolt for various reasons and
although fiscal conditions play an important role in such behavior economic theories are
hardly adequate in explaining the entire situation.
If Ted Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation is correct in arguing that an individual’s
behavior to deprivation is relative to the environment in which they reside, then culture
has a large impact on revolutionary behavior. One’s perception of deprivation is shaped
through one’s history and religion; which is why people respond to political situations in
a multitude of ways. Some societies are able to suppress the elements of imperialism that
may lead to colonization while others are not. Some chose to give up and accept their
destiny while others do not. The element that fuels such decision making is culture.
Culture and Revolutionary Behavior: Theoretical Considerations
Because revolutions are almost entirely behavior-related phenomenons, one must
understand the dynamics that construct a group’s behavior to uncover the various causes

8

Marxist theories only briefly discuss the psychology of the proletariat and hardly touch over the cultural
attributes of society.
9
Cohan (1975) provides four subcategories of psychological approaches to revolution that focus on the:
background of individuals, repression of instincts, rising expectations and relative deprivation.
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of revolutionary transformation. In this study, culture is utilized as the means to
uncovering behavior related dynamics because culture consists of the norms and values
that construct individual perceptions in regards to the political system. If political
perceptions are subjective as most culturalist would assume, then it is essential to analyze
the immediate environment to search for factors that are most influential in shaping such
political perceptions. The political cultural factors most important within a case study
depends on the society being studied; however I believe civil society, religion, economics
and leadership configuration/style are the most essential components of revolutionary
behavior within a nation. The approach utilized in this work to explain revolutions
combines post Marxist based notions of economics such as that of Pierre Bourdieu’s with
culturally rooted elements.
An Alternate Approach
Populations revolt for different reasons, which is why a political cultural approach to
explaining revolution is necessary. Most social science theories are concerned with how
groups attempt to get what they want.10 So such theories are essentially focused on how
certain circumstances such revolution occur rather than why they occur (Thompson, Ellis,
Wildavsky, 1990). The trouble with explaining revolutions in such a way is that the how
(revolt/revolution) question is already answered. Although mass mobilization is not
always the way a certain group may go about getting what they want, one must ask why
revolutions take place to understand why they occur among specific groups and in certain
circumstances while they may not within other groups with the same or similar
circumstances. Political preference construction is incredibly important in the study of

10

In this case study I am concerned with the wants that are demanded of the government rather than the
population and society itself.
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revolutions as it allows us to uncover the demands of individuals within a group that
eventually leads such individuals to revolt (Thompson, Ellis, Wildavsky, p. 97). Most
social science approaches provide little insight into revolutionary behavior and they tend
to do little more than argue that revolutions occur as a result of instability. How
individuals perceive political instability is just as important as acknowledging that
instability is present within a particular system.
Cultural Theories of Revolution: Problems and Prospects
As with many concepts utilized in the field of political science the term culture is
described through varying definitions. Although not all explanations are the same, most
definitions of culture focus on the norms and values that influence political behavior
(Wildavsky, 1998 p. 1). Although defining the term can have its challenges, issues of
conceptualization are hardly unique to the study of political culture. To completely omit a
variable such as culture in a study on political behavior is unfeasible because revolutions
are almost entirely reliant on the (culturally formed) behavior of the masses. So although
culture can be considered a broad term refering to various dynamics, it appears to work
well in large scale behavior related movements such as revolution that are based on a
broad range of issues. Some scholars believe that cultural based approaches are
reductionist in origin and tend to be overly descriptive (Chilcote 1994, pp. 186-189).
Although cultural based theories can be considered somewhat reductionist, such
approaches still permit a greater of level of generalization than rational choice
approaches. Some also claim that cultural theory is too concerned with “passive and
conditioned behavior rather than active and spontaneous behavior” (Chilcote p. 186). All
political science theories aim to build to generalizations, therefore the fact that cultural
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theory focuses on patterns of conditioned behaviors is hardly unique to cultural based
approaches. Spontaneous behavior simply can not be generalized in order to build a
theory. And, because all theories focus on some sort of pattern building process,
conditioned or repetitive behavior /situations are essential to building a solid approach.
Some argue that political cultural/psychological approaches are only utilized when
contending theories fall short of answering the question at hand, or simply as a theory of
last resort (Wildavsky 1998 p. 1). Although using such theories as last resort measures
are not always the worst case scenario, it certainly proves that most political science
scholars dislike detail orientated approaches such as political culture. The problem is not
that political cultural approaches are unreliable or weak; it is that that many political
scientists avoid variables such as culture because such variables are simply difficult to
quantify. If social scientists can come to an agreement that culture is comprised of norms
and values that shape our orientations, we as political scientist can get past the main
issues that surround this dilemma and focus on qualitatively analyzing the political
dynamics of culture. Yes, culture is difficult to quantify, changes little over time, and has
numerous dynamics that are tricky to measure; but that only proves that we must study its
political elements qualitatively over a long period of time to understand its impact on
institutions, leadership and systemic transformations. To utilize micro level data such as
culture to explain a macro level phenomenon such as revolution is without a doubt a
challenging task; nonetheless such a study is feasible and almost certainly one of the most
reasonable ways to explain reoccurring revolutionary behavior within certain systems.
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Conclusion
Revolutions occur for varying reasons therefore understanding the dynamics that lead
to such behavior is essential. How these movements occur can be explained through
numerous theories but almost all fall short of explaining why revolutions have almost
become a norm within some nations. If internal and external factors like leadership
structure and stability of the economy are relatively similar or quit possibly better in a
particular nation, then why would those people revolt? How do their perceptions differ in
regards to politics? What makes individuals within a particular nation chose
revolutionary transformation as a means to dealing with instability? These questions can
be answered by utilizing a political cultural approach to explaining revolution. Marxist
based theories of revolutions focus entirely on the economic aspects surrounding massive
uprising, so such theories can only be applied to revolutions that result from economic
instability. Structural theories rely too much on institutions and essentially overlook the
role of individuals or groups in revolutionary transformation. Cultural based approaches
to explaining revolutions are far more comprehensive than theories that focus strictly on
the economy or structure of institutions; because such approaches consider individual and
group perceptions regarding politics. This cultural theory of revolution does not overlook
the economic factors that have been found to influence revolutionary transformation;
instead it utilizes parts of Marxist based theories to prove that although the economy may
have an impact on behavior, group orientations in regards to the regime matter.
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CHAPTER 2
IRAN’S REVOLUTIONARY CULTURE: MONARCHISM,
NATIONALISM, SHI’ISM AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE
Iran has a revolutionary culture that is comprised of a unique combination of politicalreligious economic and historical dimensions. The factors discussed in this chapter may
not be sufficient in causing massive uprising within other nations; however such
dynamics appear to cause a revolutionary culture among the Iranian people. If revolutions
are simply the result of unbearable widespread oppression, then scholars such as
Goldstone are correct in asking why revolutions occur in some nations or within certain
groups and not in others (Goldstone, 2003). In this chapter, the focus will on Iranian
monarchism, twelver Shi’ism, Iran’s history of nationalism, and the notions of justice that
appear to have contributed to a revolutionary behavior that has almost become second
nature for the Iranian people.
Some scholars such as Samih Farsoun and Mehrdad Masheyekhi believe that political
culture in Iran can be divided in four ideological groups “monarchist”, “secular
democratic”, “Islamic” and “liberal nationalistic” ( 1992, p. 9). By dividing Iranian
political culture into four distinct groups, I believe the scholars oversimplify political
culture within Iran and overlook other important features that contribute to this
revolutionary behavior. Iranian political culture is more detailed than what scholars such
as Farsoun and Masheyeki (1992) believe it to be. Iranian political culture can be
understood in terms of the nation’s monarchist past, Shi’ism, nationalism and social
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justice. Although these factors may overlap throughout the course of this chapter, they
are without a doubt the components most significant to Iran’s revolutionary behavior.
As discussed in the previous chapter, political culture is in essence the orientations
that an individual or group may hold in regards to politics. Political orientations are
shaped by the environment; therefore the history, religion, ethnicity, language and
institutions essentially constitute the political culture of a given nation. The combination
of these elements has created a revolutionary culture that is unique to the Iranian people.
If isolated, such elements would more than likely have little impact on revolutionary
behavior, however when combined, they cause Iranians to not only question their
political system but also allows citizens potential opportunities to implement political
transformation.
Monarchist Roots of Political Culture
The Iranian monarchic system has been a driving force in the Iranian political culture
for thousands of years; however the image of the kingship has changed significantly over
time. The positive image that kings held during the Achamenian dynasty (550-330 B.C.)
has been essentially lost because of the path that Persian kings took in order to maintain
power. What began as an empire based on social justice has transformed to an empire
rooted in absolutism. The absolutist nature that the kingship took on eventually pushed
Iranians to revolt. The constitutional revolution was the first step that Iranians took to
free themselves of what some perceived as nothing more than a dictatorship. Over time
frustration with the dysfunctional kingship was heightened to a point that essentially
became unbearable to the Iranian people. The focus of this section will be on the
Achamenian, Sassanid, Safavid, Qajar and Pahlavi dynasties due to their impact in
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shaping Iranian political culture and identity, and because of the significant political
events that took place during these dynasties.
The original inhabitants of Persian lands were believed to be Assyrians; however they
were invaded by the Median and Persian tribes during the reign of King Shalmensar
which ruled from 858-852 BC (Limbert, 1987 p. 54). During this period, the Medians
overthrew the Scythians, Assyrians and “subdued” (p. 54) the Armenians of eastern
Anatolia. Eventually the Achamenian Empire emerged under the rule of King Cyrus (also
known as Cyrus the Great and son of Cambyses and Mondana).11 Cyrus ultimately
rebelled against the Median lord and conquered the Medes (p. 55). During the
Achamenian Empire Persia was expanded to include Lydia, Afghanistan, Babylonia,
Mesopotamia, Syria, Phoenecia and Palestine (p. 55). As a result, Persians were
extremely proud of their great king and frequently associated their nations triumphs to
Cyrus and a various other kings that followed.
Sassanid Dynasty (224-651 A.D.)
The Sassanid dynasty was known for two major achievements that have clearly had an
impact on Iran’s political culture. First, the Sassanid Empire was essentially responsible
for centralizing the government and dividing the Iranian society into four groups;
“Priests, warriors, secretaries and commanders” (Curtis, Hooglund 2008, P. 11).
Therefore the Sassanid dynasty formed social stratification within a society that was
created on the bases of equality and justice. Some would say Iran’s problems began with
the implementation of such stratification that was essentially shunned by kings in the
past. The Sassanid dynasty was also responsible for adopting a state religion (Limbert
11

Cambyses was Persian and Mondana was the daughter of a Median king, therefore Cyrus was
representative of the unity between the two tribes until Cambyses overthrow the Medians ( John Limbert,
1987 p. 54).
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1987) that again was avoided by previous kings in order to promote equality and shy
away from favoritism among the citizens of the nation. By declaring Zoroastrianism as
the state religion, the Sassanids essentially alienated minority groups within the nation
and added to the stratification that had already fragmented the Iranian people. It is
nonetheless extremely important to acknowledge the policies implemented by the
Sassanids because they introduced elements of Iranian politics that have carried on
throughout Iran’s political culture.
Safavid Dynasty (1501-1736 A.D.)
The Safavid dynasty has also influenced the Iranian political culture in a way that is
evident in the scholarly literature on Iran. Prior to the Safavid dynasty, Iranians were
conquered by Arabs and forced to adopt Islam. When the Safavids came to power they
not only added a religious ideology to Iranian politics but also established Shi’ism as the
state religion (John Limbert 1987, p. 70). Some scholars believe that the early period of
Safavid rule could essentially be considered theocratic in nature (Curtis, Hooglund 2008,
p. 18). The Safavids are said to have intentionally chosen Shi’ism as the state religion
because it essentially distinguished Iranians from their Sunni-Arab neighbors, created a
sense of national identity that was absent during Arab rule, and legitimated their dynasty.
(Limbert 1987, p. 72). During the Safavid monarchy Iranians gained a sense of national
identity again that was nearly forgotten. Persians were again given the opportunity to
celebrate their culture and history as a people. The famous Shahnameh was written
during the Safavid dynasty as a means to celebrating the kings that ruled over Iran
(Limbert 1987, p. 73). Although the Safavids were known for eliminating the caliphate
and establishing Shi’ism as the state religion (Monochehr Dorraj 1990, p.84), they were
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also known for the heavy taxation policies that depopulated cities and ruined countrysides
(Limbert 1987, p. 73). The Safavids also maintained strict control over religious affairs
within the nation (p. 74). During this period two types of Ulama were brought into
Iranian politics; one that was appointed by the state and filled official religious posts and
the other an unofficial type of Ulama that had non governmental functions (Dorraj 1990,
86).12 The major achievement of the Safavids was clearly their role in converting Iranians
to Shi’ism and instilling a national identity among Iranians that was nearly forgotten as
the result of foreign occupation.
Qajar Dynasty (1794-1925 A.D.)
Iran, under the Qajar dynasty, confronted a wide range of problems and new sets of
challenges. During the Qajar era, Iran was characterized by its political weakness,
military and diplomatic defeats, economic stagnation, territorial loss, protests, emergence
of religious movements and disputes between religious and tribal factions (Limbert 1987,
pp. 75-79). The Qajar kings essentially monopolized violence, administration, and
taxation in Iran and utilized such powers continuously throughout the dynasty (Ervand
Abrahamian 2008, p. 8). Although Shi’ism was maintained as the state religion, it was
without a doubt marginalized to empower the kingship. The loss of Georgia, Darband,
Ganjeh and Baku through the Goleston Treaty with Russia proved that Iran had lost its
power in the region and that the monarchy was failing its people (Limbert 1987, p. 77).
Territorial losses exposed the nation’s weakness to the world but the internal disputes that
the Qajars provoked damaged much of the unity among Iranians. 13

12

Prior to the introduction of the Shia Ulama system there was no official position for members of the
Ulama in politics.
13
Prior to Qajar rule, ethnic diversity was not an issue; however in order to strengthen the kingship, the
Qajars promoted racial, religious and ethnic disputes that eventually set tribal factions against each other.
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The Qajars kings enjoyed lavish trips to Europe which essentially enraged citizens of
Iran who were struggling through a period of economic instability. Economic turmoil and
government deficits led to further taxation which essentially reached its limit by the early
1900’s (Abrahamian 2008, p 38). After selling construction rights for railways,
tramways, damns and roads to a British citizen in efforts to raise government revenue,
Nasser Al Din Shah moved on to selling a monopoly of the sale and export of tobacco to
yet another foreigner (p. 38). Iranians responded to the Shah’s tobacco policy by
boycotting tobacco and causing the Shah to essentially reverse the concession; however
numerous smaller concessions were continually implemented by the king. 14 Frustration
continued to grow among the Iranian people which eventually led to the constitutional
revolution of 1906. The Qajar king who followed only continued the legacy of his
predecessors by borrowing money from European banks in return for additional
concessions (Limbert 1987, p. 79).
Throughout the period of the Qajar dynasty, Iran suffered ethnic, religious and tribal
fragmentation. Religion was marginalized in order to strengthen the kingship, repression
increased, taxation increased as did general frustration with the system. The monarchy
had created a distance between itself and its citizens that led to boycotts, protests and
eventually revolts. The absolutist nature of monarchical rule essentially alienated the
Iranian people by disregarding Iranian values such as social justice.
Pahlavi Dynasty 1926-1979 A.D.)
The Pahlavi dynasty had to contend with similar issues and forces in a more or less
unfriendly international political environment as the previous Qajar rulers. Reza Shah
tried to emphasize the Persian roots of Iran through increased secularization and limiting
14

It is said that even a number of the Shah’s wives participated in the boycott.
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the power of the Ulama but his policies only intensified the problems the Pahlavi dynasty
would face in the future(Limbert, p. 85). Taxes, alienation and repression increased but
eventually became unbearable during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah. The policies
the Pahlavi dynasty pursued hardly supported social justice, equality and the communal
rights that Iranians valued throughout their long history. Over time the Iranian kingship
had simply changed into a mechanism of control and absolute rule rather than an
institution in which Iranians could identify with.
Persians initially began to question the legitimacy of the monarchy during the
Sassanian era as it became authoritarian while being empowered by the Zoroastrian faith
(p. 60).15 The relationship between the people and the monarchy changed after the
Achamenian dynasty; repression increased because the majority of the kings following
the Achamenian Empire did not achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Retaining
the throne essentially became more important to the Persian kings than social justice. 16
Iranian perceptions in regards to the kingship shifted over time to eventually represent the
anger and frustration that Iranians felt. It is easy to see that Iranian political culture is
heavily influenced by its long monarchic tradition.
There is no doubt that the absolutist nature in which the Iranian monarchy took on
over time, led to a revolutionary culture among Iranians. The policies in which the later
kings pursued seemed to be geared around gaining more power for the kingship rather
than protecting and providing for the Iranian people. The monarchic traditions of the past
were no longer as important as ideals such as social justice for the Iranian people.
15

“Sasan was local lord of Fars and keeper of the shrine of the goddess Anahita at Istakhr, a religious
center near persopolis” (Limbert 1987 p. 60). During the Sassanid dynasty, the kingship was essentially
maintained by leaders and lords of the Zoroastrian faith.
16
Anushiravan was the last “just” (Limbert, 1987 p. 61) king that Iranians would encounter throughout
their history. He ruled from 531-579 during the Sassanid dynasty.
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Iranians today reminisce of the old kingship that promoted justice, equality and
diversity and perhaps question what happened to such values that were the pillars of the
old Persian society. Can any other king be as great as Cyrus, or are Iranians just living in
a dream? Was Anurshirvaran really the most just king? Do Iranians truly believe these
men were so great? It appears that most Iranians do deem the greatness of the ancient
kings that ruled Persia to be true. The greatness of such kings whether true or not has
created a value system for Iranians that carries on to this day. Iranians truly believe that
the nation was established by the great king Cyrus and attribute their general shortfalls as
a people to the leaders that ignored the diversity and justice that the nation was founded
upon. Iranians also seem to believe that their role as citizens is to achieve the glory that
Persia once had by restoring justice within the nation. How justice and similar notions are
achieved can be debated, however, the Constitutional Revolution of 1905 and the 1979
revolution are symbolic of how far Iranians will go in order to try and implement their
social vision and realize these ideals.
Nationalist Roots of the Iranian Political Culture: Zoroastrianism,
Monarchism and Shi’ism
Iranian nationalism was initially based on the history of the Persian Empire and its
role as one of the largest and most dominant empires of the time. The Persian Empire
during Achamenian dynasty had physical boundaries that consisted of current day Iran
and segments of India, Armenia, Afghanistan, Assyria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan,
Palestine, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and Libya. Although expansionist, the Persians
were able to dominate parts of the world and accept the various races that became part of
the vast empire. It appears that present day Iranians have formed a sense of superiority
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based on their expansionist history and that this nationalism although manifested in
Persian art, music, customs and history has formed a bond between Iranians of almost all
ethno-linguistic backgrounds.17 The Persian Empire was unique because of the racial,
ethnic and religious diversity found among its citizens. Modern day Iran is no different.
Mackey claims that although present day “Iran is cast in a mold of Persian language and
culture, it contains within its borders other groups who speak their own languages and
possess variations of Persian culture” (Mackey 1998, p. 2). The diversity of the nation
proves that nationalism does not have to be comprised of strictly ethnic elements in order
to build a bond among it citizens. Nationalism is based on the history that certain people
share that not only unites them but also distinguishes them from others outside of their
group. 18
Some scholars believe that Iranian nationalism stems from the nation’s long history of
foreign invasion that dates back thousands of years. (Farsoun and Masheyehki 1992,
p.84). Foreign occupation in Iran began with the Greeks in 334 BC and continued with
the Arabs in the seventh century, Turks in the eleventh century, and eventually the
Mongols in the thirteenth century (p. 84). How this history shaped the Iranian psyche is
hardly debatable; Iranians have formed a sense of distrust that is nearly impossible to
overlook. Iranians are known for their insecurity and mistrust which is the result of
foreign invasions that led to war, bloodshed and destruction; that was only partially
stabilized nearly six hundred years later (Amuzegar 1991, p. 99-101). Extended periods
17

Iran currently has over 150 languages spoken within its borders, the ethnic and linguistic diversity is
absolutely visible within the nation however Farsi or Persian is the language spoken by nearly all
inhabitants of Iran. Azari Turkish is the 2nd most common language in Iran and the 2nd largest group in Iran
as well.
18
For Iranians nationalism serves a mechanism of unity and a means to distinguishing themselves from
their Arab neighbors. Iranians have tried for years to show to the world that although they are Muslim they
are different from Arabs in that they speak a different language, look different, have a different history and
are racially and ethnically very different from the Arabs who conquered them.
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of instability essentially caused Iranians to be become fearful of not only foreign
occupation but foreigners in general. For generations, Iranians have felt a sense of
helplessness which has contributed to this revolutionary culture that they are
experiencing today.
Persians have been invaded numerous times throughout history however their culture
had remained relatively untouched until the absorption of the Arab-Islamic Empire.
Although Iranians adhered to Islam they were able to maintain most of their language by
adopting only the Arabic alphabet (Mackey 1998, p. 41). Their shared cultural ties to the
past were only partially lost with the transition to Islam. Therefore, Persians were able to
maintain the most important elements of their culture. While adhering primarily to the
religious elements of Arabic culture, Iranians were able to preserve the various cultural,
linguist, and territorial bonds that kept them united and contributed to a strong sense of
nationalism.19
Memories of past invasions left Iranians in fear for the survival of not just the people
but their precious history that had survived mainly through Iran’s historic monarchy. This
memory of “negative and exaggerated fear of foreigners” eventually transitioned to a
modern form of nationalism, based on national autonomy during the “…sixteenth century
reunification of the Iranian territory under the Safavid dynasty” (Farsoun, Masheyehki
1992, p. 85). During this period Twelver Shi’ism became the official religion of the state.
Therefore Iranians were essentially able to take credit for a form of Islam that not only
distinguished them from Arabs but also appeared to align more closely with their
leadership structure.

19

Iranians chose Shi’ism as the state religion because Shi’ism also served as a form of distinction from the
largely Sunni Arab population.
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During the 1930’s and 1940’s Iranians revitalized Persian culture by promoting
ancient festivals based on Zoroastrian traditions such Nowruz, Mehregan, Tirgan and
Sadeh and by promoting Persian folklore to again show that their culture was not only old
but able to adapt to the nation’s new Muslim ways (Fazeli 2006, p.62). In effort to
reunify the nation, Reza Shah renamed the nation from Persia to Iran in 1935 (Mackey
1998, p 178).20 By changing the nation’s name back to Iran, Reza Shah essentially
distinguished Iranians from their Arabic neighbors who were perceived to be backward,
uneducated and mostly tribal people. Reza Shah wanted the world to know that Iranians
were different, looked different, spoke a different language, practiced a different religion
and had very little aside from elements of their religion in common with Arabs.
To conclude, Iranian nationalism is a diverse concept that dates back to creation of the
Persian Empire that emerged during Achamenian dynasty. The belief that Iranians are
superior to others stems from the national history that Iranians of all races and ethnicities
share. The ethno-linguistic diversity although problematic throughout the Qajar dynasty,
has only had a limited impact on national unity. This is because Iranians associate with a
national identity that dates back to long history of accommodating ethnic and religious
diversity. Iranians generally appear to associate with their nation and its history more
than they do the ethnic or linguistic factors that set them apart. Nationalism to the Iranian
people is more than just simply associating with the land; it’s a connection that Iranians
share with the unique history of the land.

20

Iran essentially means land of the Aryans. It was a term that distinguished Iranians who were IndoEuropean from their Semitic neighbors.
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Shi’a Roots of Iranian Political Culture
During the Arabs conquests Iranians were forced to either adopt Islam or pay taxes
and maintain their own (Zoroastrian) faith.21 Some of the most religious segments of
society escaped to India to continue practicing their religion while the remainder of
Iranians either adopted to the Sunni form of Islam or paid taxes to preserve their faith. 22
According the Mackey (1998, p. 48), conversion to Islam was relatively easy because
Islam carried many components of their own monotheistic (Zoroastrian) faith which
essentially enabled them to retain most of their culture; while practicing Islam. 23 Some
believe that Iranians converted to Islam with ease because the social stratification created
by the Sassanids essentially caused Iranians to lose their loyalty to Persian traditions
(Limbert 1987, p. 63).
The component of Islam that did however hamper Iranian culture was clearly in the
leadership structure of the faith. Muhammad believed that people were equal before
Allah, which left no place in Islam for the Iranian kingship (Mackey 1998, p. 49).
Persians refused to let go of the kingship and the memories of the great kings that they
believed were responsible for creating Iran, it’s culture and it’s people. 24
For Iranians, Shi’ism became the religion that not only allowed for the existence of the
Iranian kingship but also supported the main components of the Islamic value system.

21

Those who paid Jizya (taxes) for refusing to convert to Islam remained part of the society as Zimmi
(protected foriegners) that had only limited rights (Bauson 2000 p. 111).
22
The Arab conquests began in 641 A.D., during the Sassanid Dynasty that was ruled by king Yazdegird
III (Bauson 2000 p. 111).
23
Mackey claims that the conversion to Islam was not difficult for Iranians because Islam was
monotheistic, promoted the fear of evil, existence of angels, heaven, hell and justice. The gradual transition
worked well because Iranians essentially replaced Ahura Maza with Allah and Zoraster with
Muhammad.(1998, p. 48).
24
Mackey claims that “although language, literature, art and architecture all acquired Arabic influences
under the mandate of religion, the soul of Persian ethos remained untouched by the Arabs” ( Mackey, 1998,
p 49).
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Shi’ism essentially surfaced because of dispute as to who would succeed Muhammad.
Shi’ites believed that Ali should be the successor to the prophet Muhammad while
Sunni’s believed the line of succession belonged to the caliphate (Momen 1985, p. 62).
The Shia movement was nothing more than dispute of political leadership that resulted in
a religious movement, eventually adopted by the Iranian people. The movement was said
to have started when Ali retired from his position as a community and military leader to
succeed the prophet Muhammad ( pp. 61-62). Some scholars such as Momen believe that
Ali must have received some type of designation from Muhammad because Arab customs
of inheritance would have given Muhammad’s uncle the position; therefore many believe
that Ali must have been told by Muhammad himself that he would succeed the prophet
(p. 61-62). 25 Ali, however, was not chosen as the successor to the prophet. Years of
battles between the followers of Ali and the Ummayads led to the formation of various
splinter groups that Ali and his followers continually battled with (Armstrong 2002, p
35). After Abu Bakr, Omar and Osman, Ali is finally selected as the caliph but only
serves a five year term before he is stabbed to death on the 21st of Ramadan (Shirazi
1980, preface). Ali’s life and death essentially became an icon of disunity and instability
surfacing from political fragmentation among the Muslim population. To Shi’i Muslims,
Ali’s existence signified the magnitude of social justice in a largely unjust world.
Iranians embraced a branch of Islam that seemed to represent elements of their
Zoroastrian past.26 Iranians generally believed that Shi’ism was the only true form of
Islam and that they were indeed true Muslims that based their faith and values on the
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As the son-in-law of Muhammad “Ali was supported by the ansar of Medina and those Meccans that
resented the rise of the Umayyads” (Armstrong 2002 p. 33).
26
Mackey describes the distinction between these two religions as: “Sunni orthodoxy portrays Arab
culture, Shia nonconformity mirrors Persian culture” (1998, p 41)
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components of justice and equality that Muhammad himself and past Zoroastrian leaders
encouraged. In a translation of Shariati’s speech on Shi’ism, a scholar by the name of
Shirazi explains how Shi’ites differ from their Sunni counterparts. 27 He argues that
Shi’ites are more concerned with justice, and equality rather than the “opulent mosques”
and fraudulent Sunni leadership system (Shirazi 1980, p. 8). Shariati claimed that Shi’ism
promotes a sense of vengeance and revolt that will ultimately result in the downfall of the
tyrants that spread justice by the sword (1980, p. 12).
Iranians appear to have selected a form of Islam that not only sheltered the monarchy
but also emphasized social justice arguably more than the Sunni form Islam. According
to Momen (p. 258-259) however, Shariati claimed that the Safavids changed the pure
form of Alid Shi’ism that represented the socially active form of Islam to a type of faith
that essentially waited for the Twelfth Imam to come. 28 Shariati argues that the Safavids
turned a revolutionary religion into a faith that utilized taqiyah 29 far too often (Shirazi
1980, p. 2). Scholars such as Shariati questioned the legitimacy of the Safavid form
Shi’ism because the Safavid kings endorsed a sense of obedience through taqiyeh rather
than adhering to the original form of Shi’ism that stood for justice. While in power the
Safavids created political posts strictly for members of Ulama. By doing so the Safavids
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“Shi’ites do not accept the path chosen by history. They negate the leadership which ruled over history
and deceived the majority of people through its succession to the prophet, and then, supposed support of
Islam and fight against paganism. Shi’ites turn their backs on the opulent mosques and magnificent palaces
of the caliphs of Islam and turn to the lonely, mud house of Fatima. Shi’ites who represent the oppressed,
justice seeking class in the caliph system, find, in this house, whatever and whoever they are seeking…”
(Shirazi 1980 p. 8)
28
“Shariati in particular presents a theory that the original ‘pure’ Shi’ism (which he calls Alid Shi’ism) was
perverted in the Safavid times so that the socially active ‘Alawi Shi’ism in which each Muslim had an
obligation to strive for achieving the ideal Shi’i society became the passive Safavid Shi’ism in which each
Muslim enjoined to sit back and wait for the advent of the hidden Imam who put everything right” (Momen
1985, pp. 258-259).
29
Taqiyah or dissimulation “is a practice in which a person hides his or her religion or religious practice in
situations that would cause a definite or probable danger as a result of the actions of those who are opposed
to his or her religion or particular religious practices” (Shirazi 1980, p. 2).
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created a cohesion between the state and religious establishment that was absent while
the Arabs ruled the nation. As time passed, however, scholars such as Shariati and
various members of Ulama began to question the legitimacy of the kingship and the
doctrine that it endorsed.
The Shi’a Religious Establishment
The religious establishment in Iran has varied in regards to its political involvement,
but, its role in Iran has been evident since the period in which Islam took hold of the
nation. 30 Prior to the Safavid dynasty, Islam was simply a religious institution with only
a limited role in politics; however the Safavid’s changed the function of the Ulama by
creating a unity between the two institutions. As would be expected though, political
involvement of the Ulama did however vary in regards to individual preference. Some
clerics chose to keep their role limited to only issues that directly affected religious laws
while others decided their function in the political system should be me more universal. 31
Some clerics were even ostracized and attacked by theological students for their
involvement in politics therefore in certain cases the clergymen at Qom had no other
choice but to abandon clerics that chose such paths. 32
The Ulama’s power and role in politics continued to fluctuate throughout time.
During the Qajar dynasty its power was limited because of the absolutist nature of the
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Iran is not a secular nation. Religion and politics have been intermixed ever since the Sassanid dynasty
declared Zoroastrianism as the state religion and this policy continued even after the nation became
Islamic. In more recent times Ayatolla Boroujerdi, Ayatollah Seyyed Kazem Yazdi and Ayatollah Haeri
were said to have been clerics that steered away from political involvement unless laws or bills appeared to
be in variance of religious rules(Farsoun, Masheyekhi 1992 p. 59).
31
Ayatolloah Kashani pushed for the religious establishment to have a greater role in Iranian politics;
however the religious center of Iran (Qom) remained indifferent toward his actions. Clerics such Boroujerdi
kept their distance from him because of his involvement politics (Farsoun, Masheyekhi 1992, p. 60).
32
Ayatollah Seyyed Ali-Akbar was “…ostracized after his involvement in politics in 1953. Theological
students attacked his home as well as the bookstore owned by his son in the Qom bazaar, and the Ayatollah
had no recourse but to flee Qom” (Farsoun, Masheyekhi 1992, p. 60).
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kings however the religious establishment attempted to gain political influence once
again during the Pahlavi dynasty. In order to partially deal with the growing power of the
Ulama, the Shah started the White revolution (1963); a series of reforms that would
essentially interfere with the role of the religious establishment. 33 The Shah perceived
the Ulama’s behavior as a threat to him and the kingship in general. In a sense, the White
revolution was simply a way for the Shah to prove that the power of the kingship was far
greater than that of the religious establishment. The Ulama continued to disagree with the
Shah; however the Shah responded by portraying the religious establishment as a barrier
to Iran’s modernization process. 34
Ayatollah Khomeini changed the role of the clergy and brought a sense of
politicization to the religious establishment that was generally absent in the past.35 Many
believe that his charismatic personality changed the way the Iranian people perceived the
Ulama and essentially gave the religious establishment the political authority that esd
needed in order to change the system. The clerical establishment became more politically
active over time in order to respond to the policies that attempted to eliminate clerical
interference in politics. Over time the clash between the monarchy and the religious
establishment grew, which eventually led to a revolution in 1979 that essentially put an
end to the Iranian monarchy and handed control over to the Ulama.

33

The White revolution essentially dealt with “reorganization of government, privatization of certain class
of government owned factories, profit sharing plans for some workers, and the enfranchisement of
women…” Mackey 1998. p. 220).
Some members of religious establishment opposed segments of the reforms; mainly those that dealt with
land reform and the measures that provided women with the right to vote (Kamali 1998. p 145).
34
“The Clergy was characterized as having rejected modernization to the extent that they banned radio
programs, considered modern education as a corrupt institution and regarded civil service work as vulgar”
(Farsoun, Masheyekhi 1992, p. 61).
35
He portrayed a sense of connection between the religious establishment and the people that had not
occurred in the past. He accepted modernization, and connected with the members of the younger
generation in a way that no other cleric had done before (Farsoun, Masheyekhi 1992, p. 65).
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The Shi’a clerical establishment in Iran has also had some influence in shaping
political culture within the nation. The positions in which the Ulama were given in the
government distinguished them from the Sunni form of leadership and bestowed a power
to the clerical establishment that was never before seen within the Islamic community.
The Sunnis shunned the Iranian Shi’ites for politicizing Islam but the Iranians believed
that their form Islam was better suited for their monarchic system. The role of the
religious establishment has continued to grow ever since the 1979 revolution and this
transition has without a doubt influenced political culture within the nation.
Today, Shia political culture is visible through much of the rituals and traditions found
in Iran. Such rituals and traditions include prayers, narrative recitations and street
processions.36 These rituals include a prayer known as Namaz that is preformed on a
daily basis. In addition to the daily prayers in Iran, there is a Friday prayer, in which
Muslims typically attend the Mosque to pray and listen to members of the religious
clergy discuss a variety of matters that may at times include current political issues.37
Friday prayer is a time in which clerics can preach about morality but also occasionally
discuss issues that one may believe is out of the realm of the religious establishment. The
ritual of narrative recitation can be considered to be one of the most politicized traditions
of Shi’ism within Iran. Although according to Tamadonfar this ritual is practiced
throughout the year, it appears to be most intense during the month of Muharram (Ray
Brown and Michael Marsden 1994, p. 26). During this month Shi’ites essentially narrate
the life of the Shi’a martyrs on the streets in their homes and the mosques. The political
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Tamonadonfar explains that “While such rituals are practiced primarily by the Ithna ‘Ashari (Twelver)
Shi’is, other extremist and moderate Shi’is also exercise these rituals” (Brown, Marsden 1994. p. 26).
37
Matters of politics are widely discussed by the clerics during Friday prayer however other matters such
as the family, morality etc. are also discussed.
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motive behind such narrations is clear; Iranians want to remind everyone of the injustice
that Shi’ites have endured throughout history and that such injustices will neither be
forgiven nor forgotten. Street processions also serve as reminder that justice and sacrifice
are important components of Shi’ism. 38 Such processions are followed by mini ritual
plays that essentially reenact “…the events of Karbala and martyrdom of Hussein”
(Brown, Marsden 1994, p. 28). 39
Political culture within Iran is clearly influenced by the history of Shi’ism and its
establishment as the state religion. Iranian Shi’ites continue to remind themselves of the
injustice that Ali encountered at the hand of the Sunni Caliphs and associate such
injustices to the leaders that repressed them throughout history. The political dimensions
of Shi’ism have been ingrained in to Iranian culture in a way that is simply impossible to
refute. Even the religious minorities within Iran can associate with the political
dimensions of the state religion. Shi’ism simply acts as reminder to the Iranians that they
as people must continue to pursue social justice in what they perceive as an unjust world.
The Political Roots of Social Justice
The concept and the struggle to achieve social justice plays an important roles in
guiding the decisions and thought process of many Iranians. What justice means to
Iranians is hard to explain because Iranians tend to feel the concept emotionally rather
than actually defining it. 40 The following section will attempt to explain how the
concept of social justice originated as a component of political culture, what it means,
38

Tamadonfar explains that during such processions men walk the streets and beat their chests with either
their fists or chains and sometimes beat their foreheads with swords to ritualize the death of Hussein and
his companions (Brown, Marsden 1994. p. 26).
39
According to Tamadonfar such plays became popular in Iran because of support from the Safavid and
Qajar leaders and later gained popularity in Iraq and Lebanon as well (Brown, Marsden 1994. p. 28).
40
Mackey argues that “Because the concept of justice is as much mystical as a concrete bond between ruler
and ruled, Iranians feel justice more than they define it” ( 1998 p. 24).
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how it has transferred throughout time as well as its impact on Iranian political culture
today.
To Iranians social justice fundamentally equates to acting in a way that supports the
values of one’s community rather than one’s individual self interest. Therefore the needs
of society as a whole are perceived to be more significant than one’s individual needs.
Social justice promotes honesty, equality and responsibility to the community. The
concept also allows for a sense of injustice to run deep as Iranians have long memories
regarding arbitrary rule, foreign encroachment, and other similar situations where the
values of the community are either disregarded or trampled upon. Iranians make
communal issues personal therefore instead of emotionally detaching themselves from
acts that violate the values of society, they personally involve themselves in such issues.
As a result the line between personal and communal is blurred within Iranian culture.
The concept of social justice essentially became embedded within the Iranian culture
through its pre-Islamic religious roots. Zoroastrianism essentially explains life as a battle
between good and evil or those who are just and unjust. Iranians therefore attained a
dichotomous perception of the world through their Zoroastrian roots. Zoroastrians also
believed that in order for a leader to maintain legitimate control over a nation he or she
must rule a society based on justice; therefore Persians believed that their leaders must
consider the needs of the Persian community before considering one’s own personal
needs (Mackey 1998, p. 23). A leader that failed to consider the needs of his people was
simply not a legitimate leader. Due to Zoroastrian influence, kings during the
Achamenian and Sassanid dynasty were generally proponents of a Persian political
system rooted in social justice. King Cyrus (of the Achamenian Empire) and King
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Anurshiravan (of the Sassanid Empire) were both believed to have emphasized a Persian
value system rooted in social justice.41
The importance of social justice appears to have carried on with the nation’s
introduction to Shi’ism. Many Shi’ites believe that Ali should succeed Muhammad
simply because he was the first convert to Islam and also because Muhammad had
personally introduced him to many as his successor (Tabatabai 1975, p. 40). Sunnis
however maintained control of the Caliphate; during which time supporters and
descendants of Ali began political movements in opposition to what they considered an
illegitimate line of succession. 42 The deaths that resulted from the battle for leadership
essentially lent to a political culture rooted in social justice that continues to this day. 43
The sacrifice that both Ali and Husayn made in order to restore the leadership structure of
Islam is viewed in a positive light by Shi’ites. Shi’ites mourn the death of the martyrs
today but celebrate their role in attempting to restore social justice in world that appears
to have moved away from such values.44
Today Iranian political culture is heavily rooted in the values of both Zorastrianism
and Shi’ism. Protests and small uprisings have become a norm in Iran because of the
way that Iranians perceive social injustice and their obligatory role in obtaining it.45
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“Khosrow I Anurshiravan (ruled 531-579), marked the apogee of Sassanian wealth, power and prestige.
In Iranian national tradition, Khosrow I was the pre-islamic monarch. Islamic writers have called him aladil (“the just”) and have portrayed his rule as the model of kingship” (Limbert 1987, p. 61).
42
Shi’ism has been distinguished from Sunni Islam in that it from the beginning promoted revolutionary
behavior through protest (Tabatabai 1975, p. 41)
43
Husayn the grandson of the prophet Muhammad continued the battle for leadership with the support of
many Muslims, however as he approached the Umayyad camp to show the letters that prove that he had
backing, he and his small army of approximately 72 armed men and women were killed. The day that
Husayn was killed by the Umayyad’s is know today as Ashura. (Momeni 1985 p. 30).
44
Social justice in the form of martyrdom was not unique to the Islamic faith as it was practiced and
endorsed by early Zoroastrian prophets such as Mani. Dorraj explains that “Refinement of the soul was,
for Manichaeans, possible only through self-denial and avoiding the pleasures of the flesh” (Dorraj, 1997.
p.4)
45
Iranians believe that it is their obligation as a people to recognize and respond to injustice.

42

Dishonesty or deception to one member of society is translated as social injustice to the
entire Iranian community. Iranians share the problems of society with each other;
therefore they essentially translate bad leadership as an injustice to the Iranian people that
requires massive response. Iranians tend to respond to social injustice through protests
that if large enough can result in revolutionary transformation.
Conclusion
Political culture is a combination of values that has been accumulated over time to
represent orientations toward one’s government structure, toward others in political
system and toward political activity. Iranians clearly have a strong sense of identity that
dates back to the history of the nation as a leading empire. Although Iranian identity has
shifted over time as result of various political transformations, certain elements have
remained constant. The elements that truly identify Iranian political culture are based on a
combination of components that when alone, have little impact on revolutionary
behavior, but when combined result in a revolutionary political culture that is, to a
degree, uniquely Iranian, but also somewhat typical of political culture in other parts of
the Developing World . The monarchic traditions within Iranian culture, the nationalistic
ideology, religious impact of Zoroastrianism and Shi’ism and perceptions of social justice
all create this revolutionary culture that exists within Iran. When met with injustice
Iranians essentially think of their past as a powerful empire, and envision the great kings
that ruled them, the Martyrdom of Ali and Hussayn and the massive instability that
foreign occupation caused for the Iranian people. These components of the ancient
culture cause a sense of fear, anger and insecurity that essentially translates into this
revolutionary behavior that has been witnessed in the past. The general Iranian psyche is
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therefore comprised of a combination of the social, historical, religious and political
developments of the nation. Iranians to this day feel the glory of ancient Persia and its
Zoroastrian past that built the nation but they also relive the moments in history in which
Iranian Kings abused and oppressed them. Their pride stems from such unique
components as does their revolutionary behavior that has almost come to define them as
both a people and a nation.
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CHAPTER 3
HISTORICAL ANTECENDENTS TO THE
IRANIAN REVOLUTION
Protests and small uprising are hardly unique in Iran as such events tend to occur on a
daily basis within the nation; however larger uprisings that successfully gain the attention
of the world generally occur less often. Iran has encountered a series of large scale
political protests that serve as evidence that Iranians have a culture of revolutionary
behavior which is the outcome of a clash between the absolutist nature of the Qajar
monarchy and the values of the Iranian people.
The Tobacco Rebellion of 1891-1892
Nasser Ad Din Shah, a Qajar Monarch, became renowned in Iran amongst many for
laying the foundation for political instability that would eventually lead to the Iranian
Revolution. During the period in which he was in power Nasser Ad Din Shah lost large
segments of Iranian land to Russia thereby creating an image of failure for the Iranian
people (Nikki Keddie 2003, p. 41). 46 Aside from losing land to Russia, the Qajar king
increased taxes and reduced Iranian sovereignty through concessions that essentially
handed the Iranian market over to foreigners (Mansoor Moaddel 1994, p. 10). In addition
to the concessions and land loss, Nasser Ad Din Shah heightened general disapproval
among the Iranian masses by constantly traveling the world on tax payer dollars
(Limbert, 1987). Nasser Ad Din Shah was generally disliked by the Iranian population
because his policies increased taxes on Iranians who were already suffering through
economic hardship. The Shah not only proved that he was bad at protecting his nation but
46

The 1828 treaty of Turkamanchai essentially ceded land and cash to Russia for losing the war, set a five
percent tariff limit on Russian goods and gave Russia the right to handle issues with consular employees
within the Russian court system rather than the Iranian court system (Nikki Keddie 2003, p 41).
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also that he had no expertise in handing the economic concerns of the Iranian people.
During the period in which he ruled, Iran as a nation fell apart.
Protests began in the early nineteenth century in response to a number of policies that
effectively hijacked the Iranian commerce industry and pushed Iranian merchants out of
the market. The first of such protests started in 1837 as result of what Iranians perceived
to be low quality British fabrics being imported into Iran. The Protests were initiated
when the British company responsible for importing such low quality fabrics opened a
branch in Tabriz (Moaddel 1994, p. 8). Iranians continued protest behavior by also
refusing to consume tea because Russian Georgians had taken control “… of the principle
traffic in the area where native merchants had none” (p. 8). Iranians were frustrated with
how European merchants had taken over their market and asked the government to
intervene in order to prevent Persian manufacturers from failing (Moaddel p. 8). The
economic issues brought on by Western control of the market basically undermined
Iranian handicrafts and transformed carpet weavers into low wage laborers (Keddie 2003,
p. 58). Besides taking business from Iranian merchants; the concessions given to the
Europeans by Nasser Ad Din Shah clearly interfered with the nationalist ideology of the
Iranian people.
Nasser Ad Din Shah also sold the rights to establish the first state bank in Iran to a
forienger. In January 1889 the Shah granted a concession for establishing a state bank in
Iran to a wealthy English man by the name of Baron Julius De Reueter (Brown, E.G.,
1966, p.31). The concession permitted the bank to have exclusive rights to issuing bank
notes as well as exploiting mineral resources within Iran (1966, p. 31). Nasser Ad Din
Shah had not only given major segments of the natural resource sector to foreigners but
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he also handed the rights to build railways and the first official banking system to
foreigners as well. His policies clearly showed his disregard for Iran’s autonomy as well
as the livelihood of his citizens. How were Iranians to survive when the Iranian job
market has essentially been handed over to foreigners? Some would say that Nasser Ad
Din Shah was anything but a king; he failed at protecting his nation from war, lost
segments of Iran and sold the Iranian merchant industry to foreigners. In the eyes of
Iranians, Nasser Ad Din Shah’s actions equated to selling the entire nation of Iran, its
land and its people to foreign control for simply personal profit.
The Iranian Tobacco rebellion is the first movement of the 19th century to properly
portray what some would believe as the start of Iran’s modern revolutionary culture. The
tobacco movement is also a good example of how Nasser Ad Din Shah’s policies
severely differed from the Iranian value system and how Iranians chose to manage this
divergence of values through revolutionary rooted behaviors such as protests and
rebellions. It is important to note that such movements were relatively absent in the
previous Iranian dynasties. The reason for such is because Iranians were provided with a
certain amount of freedom in regards to conducting business that was taken away from
them through Nasser Ad Din Shah’s policies. His actions essentially demonstrated how
little his values as a leader aligned with the values of the Iranian people.
The Tobacco Concessions
The famous tobacco rebellion of Iran began in response to policies implemented by
Nasser Ad Din Shah while on a trip to Europe. It believed that negotiations for the
concessions probably began around 1898 but were not fully implemented till 1890
(Brown 1966, p. 33). The tobacco concession consisted of an agreement to essentially
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rent the entire tobacco industry to a British man by the name of G.F. Talbot (1966, p. 33).
Through this agreement, Talbott was granted control over the production, sale and export
of tobacco in Iran for fifty years in return for an annual rent of 15,000 pounds, one
quarter of the annual profit and a five percent dividend on the capital (1966, p. 33). The
concession led to the creation of the Tobacco corporation of Persia which was a
corporation managed solely by the British. At the time there was over 200,000 Iranians
involved in the tobacco industry and approximately 10 million consumers of Iranian
tobacco, so the impact on the Iranian economy was undeniable, Iranians clearly lost jobs
as result of the concession (Mohsen Milani 1988, p. 48).
Nasser Ad Din Shah’s policies did not take into consideration those employed by the
Iranian tobacco industry and the impact that such policies would have on the general
public. It is however possible that Nasser Ad Din Shah was fooled by the British into
believing the tobacco concession would be good for the Iranian people because foreign
propaganda in support of the tobacco concession was everywhere. 47 It is hard to say if
Nasser Ad Din Shah was truly attempting to Europeanize or as he claimed modernize his
nation as he and much of his supporters claimed or if he was simply granting these
concessions to quickly raise revenue for his own personal use. Nonetheless the
concession that he granted had severe and negative consequences for the Iranian people.
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E.G. Brown (1966. p. 34) discusses a segment that was published in Iranian paper in support of the
tobacco concession that explained how the quality of tobacco will essentially go up because it will pass
through fewer hands and avoid dilution. According the Antoine Kitabji; as the merchants receive the
tobacco they mix it with other products to increase profit and with the concession such issues will
essentially be eliminated therefore consumers will receive purer tobacco. Antonie also claimed that “The
growers will be the most favored in this matter, because the merchants do them great injury by depreciating
their goods, in order to purchase at reduced prices and long term, whilst your company will be careful to
encourage the production of better qualities by paying remunerative prices, and by making advances”
(1966, pp. 34-35).
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It appears that Iranians were initially taken by surprise when news of the tobacco
concession surfaced because details of the concession were published in a British paper
before they were revealed in Iran. Iranian newspapers translated segments of the British
paper regarding the concession and provided some thoughts on the policies and it’s
impact on the Iranian people (Brown 1966, pp. 46-49). 48The Iranian people responded to
Nasser Ad Din Shah’s tobacco concession by protesting and boycotting the use of
tobacco in Iran. The tobacco protests initially began with the merchant class that has lost
jobs and businesses to British corporations. It then excelled with the help of the Ulama
that received much of their financial backing from the Iranian merchant sector and spread
with the help of ordinary citizens that were outraged by the Shah’s policies (Moaddel
1994, pp. 5-7).
In order to understand the major components of the tobacco protest it is best to start
off with a brief explanation of the two groups responsible for initiating and carrying out
the protests. The following section will focus on explaining the details of the various
groups involved in the protests; who they were, why they were important and how their
actions indicate the presence of a revolutionary culture within the nation.
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Brown (1966, pp. 46-47) provides a translation of an article in Iranian paper that explains why the
tobacco concessions are bad for Iran: “… The exports of every country are reckoned as one of the principle
sources of its wealth and that consequently the ruler of every country ought, by all possible means and in
every practical way, to facilitate and promote them, and remove restriction and obstacles to trade. But this
concession and monopoly which the Persian government has granted to the English company is
diametrically opposed to the general considerations, so that the tobacco growers are left helpless and
defenseless in the hands of the company, and will be unable to sell the produce of their toil at the
remunerative price, or to profit by trade competition”.
Ervand Abrahamian (1982, p. 73) cites a portion of an article from the Akhtar newspaper that explains how
the tobacco concession will effect the Iranian people: “It is clear enough that the concessionaire will
commence the work with a small capital and purchase the tobacco from the cultivators and sell it to the
merchants and manufacturers for higher prices, and all the profits will remain in the purse of the English.
As the Persian merchants have no right to export tobacco from Persia, those who were formally engaged in
this will be obliged to give up their business and find some other work. The concessionaire does not take
into consideration how many merchants who were engaged in this business will be left without
employment and will suffer loss in finding other occupations”.
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The Merchant Class and the Tobacco Protest
The Iranian commerce industry was already very developed by the early 1800’s as a
result of the nation’s geographic location and petty commodity production (Moaddel
1994, p. 5). At that time, Iran traded with Afghanistan, central Asia, Turkey, India and
Russia however trade for British products through India was generally limited at the time.
As Iran’s interaction with the West increased, trade also increased by three fold between
the periods of 1800-1850 and had quadrupled by 1914 so the role in which the merchant
classed played in politics increased as well. Iranian merchants were responsible for
financing government activity as well as paying government quotas, therefore proper
functioning of Iranian commerce industry was certainly vital to raising government
revenue(1994, p. 5). Besides raising revenue the merchant class was known for its social
honor as members of an elite segment of Iranian society. Members of the merchant class
were typically more educated than other Iranian classes and in some cities in Iran up to
90 percent of the merchant class was capable of reading and writing ;therefore members
of the merchant class enjoyed a certain level of prestige that even Iranian bankers lacked
(1994, p. 6). Merchants also gained much of their prestige from Islam as it promoted the
act of trading and considered merchants as messengers of God for providing goods to the
Muslim population (1994, p.6). One can see how decreasing or eliminating jobs within
the merchant industry would generally be viewed in negative light since the merchant
industry not only provided for the livelihood of many within the nation but was also
promoted by Islam.
The concession that Nasser Ad Din Shah awarded to foreign investors reduced the
amount of jobs in the tobacco industry and took tobacco profits away from Iran’s
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merchants sector. Iranian merchants shifted their interests to buying land and growing
cotton and opium crops for export; however merchants became vulnerable to shifts in the
global market that were generally not as prevalent in the local Iranian market (Moaddel
1994, p. 9). When Iranian merchants realized that they were essentially being eliminated
from commerce industry, they started devising ways to stop the concessions. The first
step that merchants took was to create a type of union called the “Majlis-i Vukala-yi
Tujjar” (1994, p. 10) also known as “the society of representatives of the merchants” as a
way to counter the Shah’s policies (1994, p. 10). The union, however, was generally
unsuccessful and quickly disbanded by the government. Some scholars believe that the
union was not dissolved solely for its support for merchants, but instead disbanded
because the union was incompatible with the “monarchical absolutism and the institution
of the Ulama” (1994, p. 10). 49 Merchants wrote protest letters and took to the streets but
their attempts at rescinding the tobacco concession had little success until religious
principles were invoked against the Shah’s policies. 50
The Ulama and the Tobacco Rebellion
Once the merchants shifted the focus of the concessions to a simple a confrontation
between Muslims and infidels rather than an issue of mere self interest, they were able to
gain the support of various segments of the religious establishment as well as the Iranian
masses. Some members of the Ulama initially had little interest in interfering in matters
of the government however once the focus shifted and the Ulama realized the impact that
49

Moaddel (1994, p. 10) argues that the Ulama were in opposition of the merchant union because it was
against paying taxes to the clerical establishment As explained earlier on in the chapter, the clerical
establishment was heavily reliant on taxes from the merchant class; therefore the merchant union was
disliked by the clerical establishment.
50
According to Moaddel (1994, p. 11) the merchants of Tehran were the first to protest by writing and
distributing leaflets that said “Tobacco belongs to Iranians, the buyers and consumers are Iranians, why
should then tobacco trade be monopolized by foreigners?” The protests also took hold in Fars where
politically minded merchants began sending telegrams to their cities government officials.
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such concessions would have on the clerical establishment they stepped in to help put an
end to the concessions as well.51
The religious establishment was at the time very important in Iran. Therefore, if
Iranian merchants wanted any chance of repealing the tobacco concession they would
need the assistance of the clerical establishment to do so. When the merchants made the
issues surrounding the tobacco concession as a confrontation between Muslims and none
Muslims, various members of the Ulama took charge and began to writing letters to the
king and his administration in regards to the problems surrounding the concession. A
radical cleric and political activist, Al-Afghani, urged one of the highest members of the
religious establishment by the name of Haj Hassan Shirazi to issue a Fatwa calling the
use of tobacco as a war against the “Imam of the age” (Milani, 1988, p. 49). Some
members of the Ulama even went to so far as refusing to enter mosques as away to
demonstrate their resistance to the concessions. Some clerics even prevented people from
entering the mosques to answer their daily call to prayer (1994, p. 11). The Ulama
wanted to make sure that Nasser Ad Din Shah was aware of how un-Islamic the
concessions were and that the religious establishment would not tolerate such injustice
toward Muslims. The Ulama invoked a sense of Persian nationalism by promoting antiWestern rhetoric as a means to waking the masses in order to repeal the Shah’s tobacco
concession (Milani 1988, p. 48). It appears that by promoting nationalist values, the
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It is important to note the existence of factions within the clerical system because certain members of the
Ulama had allegiance to the Shah and his administration rather than the people; however an overwhelming
majority of the Ulama did align with the people in order to repeal the tobacco concession (Bayat, Mangol
1991, p. 16). Bayat argues that although the Russians helped instigate the protests, the Ulama took over and
made the tobacco boycott a “semi religious, semi nationalist” opposition movement. Nonetheless there is
overwhelming evidence of a fragmentation within the clerical establishment.
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Ulama were able to gain popularity among the Iranian people and to organize even those
that had little association with the religious establishment.
Russian opposition to the concessions as well as protests and boycotts eventually
persuaded Nasser Ad Din Shah to reconsider the agreement. Bazaars in Shiraz, Tehran,
Isfahan, Tabriz, Mashad, Qazvin, Yazd, and Kermanshah were shut down when agents of
the tobacco company arrived in order to demonstrate Iran’s anger with the concessions.
Some Iranians even broke their water pipes and refused to smoke tobacco in order to
argue that without the support of Iranian consumers, the Iranian tobacco industry would
fail (Abrahamian 1982, p. 73). Throughout the crisis, Nasser Ad Din Shah remained stern
in his response to the Ulama by scolding members of the religious establishment for
refusing to adhere to his demands (Bayat 1991, p 19). It appears however that Nasser Ad
Din Shah finally realized that Iranians were not willing to hand their nation over to
foreigners without a fight. The Tobacco concessions were repealed by the Shah in 1892,
however, the decision to repeal the concession came with a hefty price. The Shah was
forced to pay large penalties to the British for annulling the concession and was also
forced to endure a sense of shame in the global market for canceling the tobacco
concessions (Milani 1988, p. 49).
The Shah increased political repression in the years following the protests by
forbidding new schools from opening. He also outlawed the news papers that had
criticized the concessions as well and discouraged publications outside of Iran
(Abrahamian, 1982, p. 73). The Shah was clearly angered with the religious
establishment for supporting the protests and dealt with his anger by instilling repressive
policies to restore what he believed was order among the unstable and angered Iranian
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population. The tobacco concessions demonstrated that Iranians were unwilling to accept
one sided policies that had little benefit for the Iranian people. The absolutist nature in
which the monarchy had taken, was clearly disliked by the Iranian population. Iranians
were fed up with the way that Nasser Ad Din Shah was ruling their nation and retaliated
by fighting for their values. It appears that Iranians perceived the tobacco concessions not
as un-Islamic but un-just and simply bad for the nation in general. They believed that it
was their duty as citizens of Iran to put a stop to policies that run counter to the Iranian
value system.
The Persian Constitutional Revolution (1905)
Nasser Ad Din Shah became extremely repressive and reactionary after the tobacco
rebellion which eventually resulted in his assassination in 1896 (Milani 1988, p. 51).
Mozaffar Ad Din Shah took control of the throne in 1893 and continued much of the
same policies that Nasser Ad Din Shah had implemented until his rule ended in 1907.
However, this time Iranians were far more organized than ever and were ready to
confront the monarchy for its wrongdoings. The Persian constitutional revolution offered
a systemic change to the absolutist structure of the Iranian government that Iranians
needed in order to regain control of their nation.
Iran as a nation fell into an even deeper economic crisis during the reign of Mozaffar
Ad Din Shah. Similar to the previous monarch, he would spend lavishly and tax the
Iranian people in order to fund his personal needs. These issues would probably be less
visible in an economically stable nation; however the decline of native industries,
economic stagnation and lawlessness magnified dysfunction in the Iranian leadership
system (Milani, 1988, pp. 52-53). Western penetration in the Iranian commerce industry
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essentially siphoned money out of Iran and into the hands of foreigners while Iranians
were left to deal with the mess the Shah had created. When the situation eventually
became unbearable, Iranians took to the streets and protested for change.
Economic Downturn
By the early 1900’s Iran had already borrowed the equivalent of its entire budget for
the year 1900 from Russia and England and its currency had significantly dropped in
value (Milani, 1988, p. 52). At the time unemployment was extremely high and as much
as 300,000 construction workers had migrated to Russia to find work. To make a bad
situation worse however, Mozaffar Ad Din Shah raised tarrifs as well as land taxes to
raise revenue and did so with the assistance of a foreign appointed minister of customs
(1988, p. 52). The king was not only betraying his people by bringing an outsider to
manage the affairs of the nation but he was doing so with little regard for how such
policies would impact the livelihood of the Iranian people.
Emergence of the Iranian Intelligentsia
The Iranian intelligentsia essentially emerged as a group of individuals who were
concerned with fundamentally changing the political and economic system within the
nation.52 Members of the intelligentsia, however, were ideologically different than the
merchants and Ulama. The intelligentsia believed that human progress was far more
important than dynastic changes within the system or, as the Ulama believed, God’s will
(Abrahamian 1982 p. 61). The intelligentsia also believed that Iran was in need of a
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Abrahamian (1982, p. 61) says that “… contact with the West- through travel, translations, and
educational establishments-created modern ideas, modern aspirations, modern values and thereby, modern
intellectuals”. “Western history persuaded them that human progress was not only possible and desirable
but also easily attainable…” Abrahamiam (1982, p. 62) also claims that “… Western education convinced
them that true knowledge derived from reason and modern science, not from revelation and religious
teachings”.
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major change that would entail an end to “royal despotism, clerical dogmatism and
foreign imperialism” (1982, p.62). Such groups essentially gained popularity through the
emergence of Masonic like secret societies such as the “Farmushkhaneh” and “Ketabcheye gheybi” led by individuals such as Al Afghani and Mirza Malkom Khan. During
weekly meetings such groups would criticize the king for his absolutism, argue for
nationalism and discuss socialist strategies for change such as mass protests and strikes
and revolutions (Kamrava 1992, pp. 33-34). Although the intelligentsia was
ideologically very different than the Ulama and merchant class, they as a group all
desired an institution that could balance power within the Iranian political system and put
an end to monarchic absolutism. Once news of the existence of such societies reached
the Shah they were banned but new societies based on the same political principles
continued to emerge throughout the reign of Mozaffar Ad Din Shah.53
Ulama, Merchant and Intellectual Class Cooperation
It appears that by 1906 Iranians had put their differences aside in order to push for the
creation of a parliament (Bayat 1991, p. 123). Iranians realized that in order to change the
system they would have to work together and overlook their political differences to in
turn achieve the ultimate goal of creating a parliamentary system. They knew that without
a parliament the absolutism of the monarchy would continue. the Iranian constitutional
revolution would not have been possible without the “hybrid coalition of forces, which
included the liberal reformers, members of the Ulama, merchants shopkeepers, students,
trade guildspeople, workers and radical members of secret societies who promoted the
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Kamrava (1992, p. 35) explains how Nasser Ad Din Shah dealt with the Faramushkhaneh:“…Like most
activities not under his control, he soon became suspicious, banning the society in 1861 and sending
Malkom to exile”. Kamrava (p. 35) argues however that such groups created a general awakening within
society that resulted in intellectual discussion and political activity.
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formation of an assembly of delegates and a constitution” (Afary 1994, p. 21). The
“religio-radical alliance” between the intellectuals and the clerical establishment
essentially made the revolution possible (p. 22). The Participation by these groups
appears to have been essential to the organizational structure that made revolutionary
change possible. 54 Iranians united to stop European domination over Iran and to prevent
the Shah from doing further damage to the economic and political system.
Iranians knew that Russia would intervene with any attempt to overthrow the Qajar
government so revolutionary action would have be taken while Russia was preoccupied
with Japan ( Keddie 2003 pp. 66-67). The constitutional revolution began when
Ayatollah Behbahani and Tabataba-i joined forced to oppose the policies of prime
minister Ayn al-Dowleh in 1905 (Kamrava 1992, p. 35). It is believed that Ayn adDowleh beat the feet of several sugar merchants in Tehran for refusing to lower the price
of sugar as he had ordered. The merchants claimed that the price increase was a result of
higher import taxes rather than their own discretion (Keddie 2003, p. 67). Behbahani and
Tabataba-i immediately moved out of the capital and into a suburban mosque in order to
display their discontent with the royal court for punishing the merchants. Merchants
angered by the government followed suit and closed their shops and bazaars not only to
show their support for the two clerics that stood up for the innocent sugar merchants, but
to also demonstrate that they would no longer tolerate government corruption (Kamrava
1992, pp. 36). Behbahani and Tabataba-i demanded the Shah create an “Edalat Khaneh”
or a house of justice and it appears that the Shah formally agreed after dismissing Ayn
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Afary explains that “ radical intellectuals, and members of the secret societies encouraged the recruitment
of both disgruntled or orthodox members of the Ulama and alienated politicians, seeing this as the only way
to create a national coalition with broad mass appeal” (1994, p. 23).
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Ad-Dowleh as governor but never stood by his promise to do so.55 Once it became
evident that the Shah would not follow through on his promise to establish a house of
justice, anger with the regime and the Shah flared again throughout country.
“clandestine leaflets, called night letter (shab-nameh), were distributed by the Anjomens
and were posted throughout the city’s walls, calling for reforms and end to absolutism”
(Kamrava 1992, p 36). Violence however continued, and only decreased when
approximately twelve to fourteen thousand merchants abruptly shut down the bazaar and
refused to return to work until some type of govern reform was implemented. 56
The revolt was successful and came to a conclusion in 1906 when the Shah gave in to
the demands of the dissenters by agreeing to implement a constitution that produced an
Iranian parliamentary system. Iranians recognized the need for an institution that could
regulate the Shah’s power and essentially end the monarchy’s absolutism. They believed
that a constitution that created a parliament could be the key to solving their differences
with the Shah and that they must continue to boycott, protest, and revolt until they
achieved their goal of creating such an institution. The protests accomplished part of what
Iranians were yearning for; a sense of pride for formally changing the political structure
of the Iranian system; however it did not entirely put an end to the Shah’s repressive
policies. The Qajar era was a very important time in modern Iranian politics because this
period marked the point in which Iranians acted on their cultural values to respond to the
Shah’s repressive policies. Throughout the Qajar era, it appears that Iranians were able to
overlook their ideological differences to improve the dubious political atmosphere that
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Keddie (2003, p. 67) explains that the “meaning and composition” of the Adalatkhaneh were probably
left unclear to perhaps maintain unity between the merchants, Ulama and the intellectuals that wanted
government reform.
56
According to Keddie “ Even more bazaar merchants and tradesmen in numbers reaching twelve thousand
to fourteen thousand took bast in the British legation, and Tehran business was at a standstill” (2003, p. 67).
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had taken shape when Nasser Ad Din Shah came to power. The groups involved clearly
had different reasons for disliking the Shah however as a group they were able to unite in
an attempt to change the components of the Iranian political system that had hindered
Iran’s global influence for decades.
Iranians felt a sense of confronting the Shah and became even more pleased when the
parliament refused a loan from Russia and established a national bank instead. By doing
so the nation was able to regain some it’s autonomy that was lost when Nasser Ad Din
Shah came to power; but Mohamad Ali Qajar hardly considered the Parliament as a
challenge. Unfortunately the parliament was not fully capable of ending the Shah’s
repression. The Qajars were eventually overthrown by the Pahlavis, but the policies that
Iranians thought would end with the conception of the constitution clearly continued. The
constitution did, however, increase media activity and bring a flurry of political ideas to
Iran that were essentially suppressed by the Shah prior to the construction of the new
constitution (Kamrava 1982, p. 87). Civil society began to flourish during this period
time. Iranians began to discuss new political ideas and formed political parties to
represent their interests in government.
When the Pahlavis came to power, Iranians were still recuperating from problems the
Qajar kings had produced but they appeared to be ready to move on and focus their
energy on the new parliament. Competition for seats in the parliament brought a sense of
plurality to the Iranian political system that was clearly absent in the past. The political
atmosphere in Iran had essentially awakened through systemic changes brought on by the
revolution. The protests, boycotts and revolts successfully changed the Iranian political
system and brought a flurry of political activity among the Iranian people. Throughout
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the period just before Reza Shah came to power Iran had a series of ideological
movements that contributed to the political atmosphere of Iran. The Iranian people had
started political movements focused on modernization, nationalism and Islamism to
represent their very distinct political attitudes that had emerged as result of the
constitutional revolution.57
Reza Shah and the new parliament
Reza Shah’s reign could be characterized by a number of policies that changed the
political and economic atmosphere of Iran. Although some of the approaches he utilized
to modernize the nation were undoubtedly good for Iranian people, an overwhelming
majority of his policies either alienated or repressed various segments of the Iranian
population. The following section will focus on the policies the Shah used in order to
retain power and how such policies essentially widened the gap between the Shah and the
Iranian masses and increased Shah’s absolute power.
Reza Shah utilized a different approach to ruling Iran by concentrating on military
growth and modernization as the central foundation of the Iranian state. Although he was
known for creating Iran’s modern infrastructure, he was also well known for his corrupt
policies that undoubtedly contributed to the frustration that led to the Iranian revolution
of 1979. While in power Reza Shah significantly expanded Iran’s armed forces by
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Micheal P. Zirinksy (1994, p. 46) explains how various ideologies emerged : “Modernization appealed
especially to elite individuals exposed to Western ideas by education or travel; during the years of Reza’s
rise., these ideas often were called liberal, republican, or socialist. Modernist sought to adapt to Iranian
conditions Western style military organization and equipment, public administration and urban structures”.
“Nationalism took different forms depending on group, education, and social orientation…” Nationalist
belong to different groups, those who supported Western secular nationalism and those that supported local
and popular control framed through an Islamic perspective. Islamist on the other hand made very little
distinction between Iran and Islam and focused more on nation’s resistance to foreign powers than anything
else.
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implementing a law that made military participation mandatory.58 Reza Shah was able to
fund military and bureaucratic expansion through profits from oil revenue, collection of
tax delinquencies and high import and export tariffs. Taxes on sugar, tobacco, cotton,
hides and opium were all increased to fund the armed forces and the bloated bureaucracy
that had taken shape while Reza Shah was in power.
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Besides expanding the military,

Reza Shah also increased control over the nation by replacing urban police officers with
friends and family that adhered to the Shah’s demands in return for large bonuses,
discounted land and key government positions.60 The Shah essentially traded positions
within the government for support of policies that could not be otherwise implemented
through popular support.
The Majles that many Iranians believed would be the key to limiting the monarchy’s
power essentially became nothing more than a puppet for the monarchy because Reza
Shah monitored access to the parliament and only permitted compliant candidates to enter
the institution (Abrahamian 2008, p. 72). The parliament that Iranians had fought so hard
to create had essentially become an extension of the monarchy by implementing only
laws that Reza Shah himself supported. While in power Reza Shah also banned political
parties, took away parliamentary immunity, closed independent newspapers, and
imprisoned or killed those who criticized him. The shah used his new dictatorial regime
to carry out policies that were generally disliked by the population.
Reza Shah maintained control of Iran with British support until he began
implementing a number of policies that both the British and Russians clearly disapproved
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The constricption law of 1925 required all healthy males over the age of twenty one to serve two full
years in the armed forces and four years in the reserves (Abrahamian, 2008. p.68).
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More than 34% of Iran’s tax revenue was spent on the armed forces (Abrahamian. 2008, p. 67).
60
The Shah even overlooked financial irregularities that proved his men were stealing in order to keep
them in power (Abrahamian. 2008, pp. 70-71).
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of. He expanded state power over the economy through a series of policies that eased out
foreign influence over Iranian territory. He essentially damaged the relationship that the
Iranian government had with Britain and Russia by removing foreign administrators from
government. By canceling a number of treaties that gave extra-territorial jurisdiction,
however, Reza Shah essentially increased his oppositional base (Abrahamian 2008, p.
76).
Reza Shah also created a significant amount of tension with the religious
establishment by implementing various laws that the reduced the Ulama’s power. Such
policies included a variety of dress codes that were intended to portray and promote a
sense of modernization among the Iranian masses. The Shah began the dress code
policies by first outlawing tribal and tradition clothing among Iranian men and later
implementing a law that legalized women to go out in public without a veil. Reza Shah
gained control of the religious establishment in Tehran and neighboring cities by
determining who could teach religious material as well as establishing the content of
scripture taught within classes. Until Reza Shah, Iranian kings generally did not interfere
in the teaching methods utilized by the Ulama; therefore such policies upset members of
the religious establishment. Moreover, Reza Shah implemented policies that made
clerics in government exchange their turbans for Western styled slacks and coats to again
promote a sense of modernity in addition to decreasing the visibility of the Ulama. Reza
Shah also went to so far as banning street processions to commemorate the death of
Shi’ite Martyrs during Muharran as well as opening mosques to foreigners (Abrahamian
2008, p. 94).
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The Shah created enemies along the way by promoting corruption within his
administration, annulling treaties, alienating minorities and weakening the religious
establishment. Dislike for him continued to grow until he was finally deposed when the
Russians in the North and the British in the South forced Reza Shah to relinquish power
and leave the nation. Reza shah focused more on expanding and institutionalizing Iran’s
armed forces than he did on the nation’s sovereignty therefore. When Russian and British
forces defeated the Iranian military in less than three days, it became clear that the
military that Reza Shah had created was only good for suppressing internal opposition to
the regime. Although his policies of modernization were without a doubt a step in the
right direction, his taxation policies and the patronage system he had implemented clearly
were not. By implementing land reform policies and protecting those in his
administration that illegally took land from private citizens, he undoubtedly undermined
the legitimacy of the monarchy and added economic turbulence to a politically unstable
environment. Although Reza Shah’s son at first significantly diverged in regards to how
to run the maintain power the damage could no longer be reversed.
When Muhammad Reza Shah came to power in 1941, Iranians were relieved to have
some form of change in the political system.61 British and Russian forces allowed
Muhammad Reza Shah to maintain control of the army in order to preserve the nation’s
armed forces in return for cooperation with the two nations. “The allies had agreed to
give the young shah a trial “period” subject to good behavior…” (Abrahamian 2008. p.
98). The Shah acted on his promise to behave in a way that the allies approved of by
granting a series of extensive land reforms that clearly made the Shah appear more honest
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Muhammad Reza Shah ruled Iran from 1941-1979.
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to the Iranian people. 62 Over time however Muhammad Reza Shah showed that he was
unable to rule Iran in the way that both Iranians and foreigners would like. The political
parties such as the Tudeh that had taken shape while his father were in power became
stronger than ever, civil society in Iran became more organized as a result of the Shah’s
lenient leadership style that essentially gave rise to oppositional movements throughout
Iran.
By 1942 inflation and food scarcities had caused an overwhelming sense of
dissatisfaction with the government. As a result Iranians created oppositional groups and
protested to counter the political and economic conditions that had surfaced. By 1942 the
situation had deteriorated; grain shortages led to hoarding and bread riots in Tehran while
taxes steadily increased in effort to balance the budget. 63 WWII also initated a disruption
in supplies which essentially caused more hoarding and the rise of black market
operations that triggered even more price hikes. Indirect taxes hit the Iranians least able
to afford them. Government monopolies on food caused producers to sell their products
to the Iranian government for even less than the free market value (Keddie 2003, p. 113).
For example the purchase and sale and wheat (Iran’s principle crop) was monopolized by
the government and by 1948 the government was paying only one third of its free market
price to wheat producers. Besides hurting peasants that relied on income from such jobs,
the monopolies also led to a significant regression in wheat production that ultimately
forced the Iranian government to import wheat after the war (Keddie 2003, p. 113).
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According Abrahamian (2008, p. 98) The shah restored Iranian property illegally acquired by his father
back to the state and returned approximately 600 million Rials that his father had stolen from the
government. While doing so however, Muhammad Reza also secretly transferred 1 million dollars for
himself to a bank in New York as a nest egg for him and his family.
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The administrator general of finances, Millspaugh introduced a progressive income tax to help balance
the budget. He was also put in charge of improving the grain collection and storing process but was
believed to have caused more damage by removing subsidies that provided cheap bread to Iranians
(Keddie, 2003, p. 107).
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A number of political groups were formed to counter to the volatile economic and
political atmosphere that Reza Shah had left behind. Political forces once suppressed by
Reza Shah resurfaced and “committed themselves to preventing the reemergence of an
imperial despotism” (Milani 1994, p. 38). The first and most prominent group to evolve
from the political circumstances of the time was the leftist organization known as the
Tudeh party. The Tudeh Party emerged from a group of European educated individuals
who were frustrated with the Iranian government’s policies that had pushed the Iranian
economy into further economic turmoil. As a Marxist based political group, Tudeh
members pushed for workers’ rights and better compensation for the Iranians that worked
for the Anglo-American Oil Company.64 The party essentially represented the educated
elites, working class, and various members of the salaried middle class. The group was
later expanded to represent trade unions with over 275 thousand members. Nearly all of
Iran’s industrial labor force belonged to the Tudeh party. The party was however
dismantled by the Shah when the secessionist movements that occurred in both
Azerbaijan and Khuzestan were blamed on the actions of the Tudeh party.65 The Tudeh
party was undoubtedly a threat to the oil industry in Khuzestan, therefore eliminating
them from the political environment was extremely important for the British.
A series of other political groups such as the Democratic Party, Toiler’s Party,
Society of Muslims, the Iran Party, the National Front, and the Milli organization had
also emerged at the time the Tudeh was in power however these groups were limited in
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According to Abrahamian (2008, p 110) The central council of trade unions organized a strike
throughout the oil industry and “… The Anglo Iranian Oil Company had no choice but to concede to the
eight-hour day, Friday pay, over time scales, higher wages, and better housing since the unions had de facto
control of Khuzestan as well as over the refinery, the oil wells, and the pipelines.
65
The government, according to Abrahamian (2008, p. 112), “…[d]eclared martial law in Tehran, clamped
down on the trade unions and closed down many Tudeh clubs and party offices throughout northern cities.”
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size and therefore restricted in influence. When the Tudeh party was essentially diffused
by the Shah a less radical and more diverse political group emerged in its place. The
National Front essentially came to power as an organization that placed the needs of Iran
and its people above all else. Many believed that the Tudeh party was more concerned
with soviet subservience rather than the needs of Iran as a nation; the National Front,
however, was more representative of the Iranian masses.
Oil Nationalization
The leader of the National Front movement, Mohammad Mussadegh came to power
by opposing foreign control of Iranian resources and encouraging protests to influence
parliamentary decisions. Mussadegh was one of the foreign educated elites that realized
Iran as a nation was in need of major reform. He came to power in the early 1900s,
serving within a variety of political positions before he was forced into retirement by
Reza Shah. While in the political realm, however, he advocated two major causes; “Strict
constitutionalism at home and an equally strict policy of “negative equilibrium” abroad to
assure independence from foreign domination (Abrahamian 2008, p. 114). Mussadegh
denounced the oil agreements made with the British and Soviets and eventually decided
his main political goal in the future would be to nationalize the Iranian oil industry.
Muhammad Reza Shah’s weakness as a leader essentially permitted Mussadegh to
gain an overwhelming amount of influence as an educated leader of the nationalist
movement. Muhammad Reza appointed Mussadegh to the position of prime minister,
however, it appears the Shah had little choice in the matter because Mussadegh had
achieved almost absolute control of the Majles by 1951 (Farhad Diba, 1986, p. 115).
Mussadegh’s “charisma created an unprecedented opportunity to effect change and as far
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as his nationalist goals were concerned, Mussadegh had the support of the majority of the
politically active urban population” (Sussan Siavoshi 1994, p. 118. He gained popularity
because of his desire to transfer the control of Iran’s natural resources out of the hands of
foreigners and back to the people of Iran. The inflation, scarcity and high taxes persuaded
Iranians to support Mussadegh’s nationalization policies.
As prime minister, Mussadegh immediately pushed for negotiations with the Anglo
Iranian Oil Company over the terms of the oil concessions. British members of the oil
industry had little desire to negotiate with Mussadegh over the terms of a resource they
believed they had full and legal control of (Siovashi 1994, p. 120). For the British the oil
nationalization issue was purely economic while for the Iranians, oil nationalization was
a political issue that focused on the “…fundamental principal of Iran’s right to the control
of its own oil” (1994, p. 120). When the British refused to amend the terms of the oil
concession, Mussadegh went straight to the people of Iran to get support for reforms.
Through petitions and street demonstrations, Mussadegh gained the support he needed to
pass the oil nationalization bill in the parliament (Abrahamian 2008, p. 117). Mussadegh
created the National Iranian Oil Company to take over the Anglo Iranian Oil Company
that controlled the Iranian oil industry since the early 1900’s. Although Mussadegh’s
intentions were to bring a sense of sovereignty to his nation by nationalizing its oil
industry, global oil consuming actors such as the United States and Europe prevented Iran
from taking pleasure from the benefits of such reforms. A series of boycotts on Iranian oil
prevented Iran from profiting through the reforms, Mussadegh therefore focused on
freeing Iran from oil dependency rather than negotiating with its biggest oil consumer;
the United States (Siovashi 1994, p. 21).
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The Coup of 1953: The End of the Mussadegh Era
If Iran’s oil nationalization policy was to be successful, there would be disastrous
consequences for nations that relied on exploiting resources from the developing world.
The United States and Britain knew that they would have to overthrow Mussadegh to set
an example and deter other resource rich developing nations from following suit.
Western nations spread negative propaganda about Mussadegh in order to try and
delegitimize his achievements and gain internal Iranian support for his removal. When
the United States and Britain realized that public support for Mussadegh was strong, the
allied forces moved on to other ideas for removing the powerful prime minister. The CIA
along with the SIS devised a plan to overthrow Mussadegh by staging a coup and
restoring the Shah’s power. With help from royalist and various members of the religious
establishment, civilian dressed military members surrounded Mussadegh’s home and
killed approximately three hundred people before taking Mussadegh into custody and
restoring the Shah’s power.
Conclusion
As one can see, revolutionary based behavior in response to repression and economic
inequality has become rather common in Iran. When met with periods of difficulty
Iranians hold their leaders responsible for such problems and typically use political
organizations to protest for change. Civil society in Iran clearly expanded and diversified
during the late stages of the Qajar era and led to the creation of numerous political groups
that were generally absent in the past. The growth of civil society groups in Iran has
made the process of organizing political movements relatively easier; therefore riots,
protests and revolutionary based behavior has increased over time. When met with
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political injustice, the primary method of change for Iranians appears to involve activities
and processes that may lead to revolutionary transformation. Iranians more than likely
find small institutional changes too slow or generally useless in meetings their demands,
because of the amount of corruption typically found in the Iranian leadership system. The
protest and revolutionary based events discussed in this chapter are proof that Iranians
frustrated with the system choose transformative change when faced with leaders that
defy the Iranian value system.
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It is important to understand that opposition groups exist in periods of high repression but until
repression is lessened they are forced to operate within very difficult parameters. By lessening repression
such groups are essentially able to communicate, organize and expand with more success.
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CHAPTER 4
THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION OF 1979
When Iranians lost confidence in the parliament’s ability to reduce the Shah’s
absolute control over the nation, they set out to reorganize the political structure of the
Iranian state by completely eradicating the monarchy. The Shah had essentially betrayed
the majority of Iranians by overthrowing Mussadegh and instilling even more repressive
policies to punish Iranians for taking political matters in their own hands. After
Mussadegh was removed from power, Muhammad Reza Shah reinforced his grip over
the nation to disband the political parties responsible for generating political competition.
As a result, Iranians utilized civil society organizations such as religious groups, schools
and unions as a means of combating the Shah’s repression.
Roots and Causes of the Revolution
When repression is elevated in a political system, oppositional movements tend to
have little opportunity for organization and expansion; therefore such movements have
only a slight impact during such phases. If repression is lessened even to a small extent,
political opposition can be reduced and eventually eliminated or be given the opportunity
to expand.91 Authoritarian leaders are generally aware of the impact in regards to
decreasing repression but are typically forced to implement changes within the system to
reduce but not eliminate repression. Pressure to reduce repression can come from inside
the regime itself or from actors outside of the nation. Outside actors with an economic
interest in the nation may push to lower repression for various reasons such as human
rights concerns but may do so at the cost of complete state failure. In the case of Iran,
Muhammad Reza Shah faced the same situation. He had control over the Iranian people
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through use of his Mussad and CIA trained secret police known as SAVAK that used
brutal tactics to subdue and eliminate oppositional groups. Any reduction in repression
could result in retaliation for the Shah’s behavior as was the case in the 1970’s. The
United States and Britain pressed the Shah to lessen repression and because the shah
owed the restoration of his power to both nations for overthrowing Mussadegh he had
little choice but to adhere to their demands.92 As repression decreased opposition
activities increased, therefore the Iranian masses were able to mobilize around a single
issue; removal of the Shah.
Although the revolution was geared toward removing the Shah, motivation to
mobilize was due to varying reasons. Different segments of the Iranian society clearly
suffered from plethora of issues the Shah had created for them. Peasants suffered from
the adverse effects of the Shah’s land reform and taxation policies, intellectuals and urban
elites from joblessness and lack of freedom, Ulama from alienation and general loss of
influence, and merchants from taxation and modernization policies that took income
straight from their pockets and into the hands of the Shah. After years of pent up anger
and frustration; Iranians organized with the help of the religious establishment to
overthrow the Shah and completely reform the Iranian political system.
Land Reform and a Move toward Industrialization
The reform policies which the Shah pursued between the 1950’s and 1970’s entirely
transformed the Iranian economic and class system. By changing the system from an
agrarian economy to an industrial economy, the Shah essentially alienated large segments
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According to H..E. Chehabi (1990, p.142) the American government was critical of attitude “… Third
World regimes in general and the Shah’s in particular”. President Eisenhower essentially said that the
repressive militaries policies of the Iranian government will not bring peace and justice to the nation and
that policies must be reformed in order to do so.
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of the Iranian population that still relied on agricultural based business for income. The
problem with the reforms in which the Shah implemented was that the Muhammad Reza
Shah did not apply a planning framework for his economic plans till much later in the
process (Robert E. Looney 1982, p. 9). For this reason the Shah’s economic development
plans only benefited certain segments of society while clearly alienating others. Over
time frustration with his policies grew because large segments of the Iranian population
financially suffered from reforms that led to higher taxation for the agriculture sector and
lower taxes for the urban capitalist based elite population.
Muhammad Reza Shah’s first attempt toward modernization and economic reform
was implemented through what he called a seven year development plan in 1949. The
plan focused on improving agriculture, transportation and communication; however most
of the objectives went largely unfulfilled because of economic difficulties during the
struggle for oil nationalization. The 2nd seven year plan occurred between 1955-1962,
during this period Muhammad Reza Shah focused on constructing factories and dams as
well as improving transportation and communication systems. The 3rd, 4th and 5th
development plans financed import substitution industrialization by relying heavily on
Western technology and managerial skills.93 The development plans led to economic
expansion, unequal distribution of wealth, heightened social mobility, changes in class
structure and a rapid and extensive decline within the Iranian agriculture sector (Milani,
1994, pp. 59-60).
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According to Robert E. Looney (1982, p. 40.) “Import substitution industrialization as implemented in
Iran created several severe sectoral imbalances. As the terms of trade turned against agriculture (due to
increased cost of manufacturers to the agriculture sector), agriculture production fell. Normally over time,
this process would be self-correcting and eventually short agriculture supplies would reverse the declining
price trend. Oil revenues permitted almost unlimited food imports at constant prices, however. As a
consequence, Iran was not only a net importer of agricultural commodities including grains in the 1970’s,
but the gap between consumption of food stuffs and domestic production was increasing at an alarming
rate”.
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The White Revolution is perhaps the most extensive and influential economic
development policy to take place in modern Iranian history. Through this measure, the
Shah made reforms to land distribution, nationalized forests, sold a number of state
owned factories to the private sector, implemented profit sharing for industrial workers,
extended voting rights to women and created rural literacy groups (Kamali, 1998, p. 144).
All of these reforms benefited certain segments of the population while harming others;
however most of the impact was due to the shah’s land reform policies. The reform
policy of 1963 forced land owners to sell vast majorities of land to the government so the
government could in turn sell it to the working class peasants at a discounted rate. The
first step of the land reform process began in 1962 through a set of laws that limited land
ownership to one village per land owner (Looney 1982, p. 45). The Shah purchased any
remaining land that did not fall within his new law and sold it to peasants at a discounted
rate in return for membership in multipurpose cooperatives. The second phase of the
land reform in 1965 provided a number of options for land owners but basically entailed
much of the same policies such as taking land from land owners and selling or renting it
to the peasant population for discounted rates.94 The objective of these reforms was to
create a rural middle class in which the government could use as political base. The Shah
was also under the impression that the compensation paid to the landlords would provide
funds for industry based investment (Looney, p. 46).The problem with the land reform
policy however was that nearly 40 percent of the rural population was completely
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According to Looney (1982, p. 46) “ A number of options were provided to the land owners the
remaining villages at that time. These included” (1) leasing their land to peasants; (2) dividing their land
with the peasants according to ownership of labor, land water seed and oxen; (3) selling their land to the
peasants ; (4) forming agricultural units with the peasants with shares of each group determined on the
basis of the ownership factors; (5) buying the peasants rights and employing them as wage laborers”.
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bypassed by the government and therefore received no benefits from the reforms at all.
The inequality of the policy soon became a driving point for opposition.
The religious establishment being one of the largest land owners of the time also
opposed the Shah’s reform policies. The Ulama however did so because the policy ran
counter Islamic beliefs in regards to the sanctity of private property and because large
segments of land donated to the Ulama over time provided a great amount of income for
the religious establishment (Kamali, p. 147). By decreasing the Ulama’s land the Shah
essentially lowered income for events and organizations operated by religious the
establishment. As part of his reform measures the Shah also created an endowment
program in 1964 to monitor and manage all public donations to the religious
establishment and as a result a number of shrines and religious schools came under the
control of the Endowments Organization (Kamali, pp. 147-149). Such alterations quickly
caused some members of the Ulama to align against the monarchy.
The Shah’s economic reform policies included a number of modernization measures
that created modern sectors of the economy without completely eliminating the power of
the bazaar. Therefore by creating supermarkets in the city as part of his modernization
measures, the shah expanded his oppositional base to include angry bazaaris affected by
the loss of business. The bazaaris clearly viewed such modernization measure as a threat
not only to Iranian tradition but also to their reputable business structure. Besides raising
taxes on the bazaaris and accusing them of price fixing, the shah also continued to fund
construction of road ways and supermarkets far from the bazaars in order to decrease the
bazaar’s influence within the nation.
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The reforms which the Shah believed would bring him greater supporter, only helped
the “dependant bourgeoisie” and “international capital” (Moaddel 1993, p. 65).
Capitalism became the dominate form of production during the Shah’s modernization
reforms and agriculture generally suffered as a result of government’s strong emphasis on
industrialization. The move to an industrialized economy angered the peasants that felt
they were fooled into purchasing land from the government. Those who benefited from
the reforms were approximately 1000 wealthy aristocratic families affiliated with the
private bank owning sector, modern communication centers, industrial sector and some
of the Shah’s own friends and family in the agro-business. Nearly 1 million families
affiliated with the bazaars suffered.
The economic policies implemented by Muhammad Reza Shah appeared to only assist
those were who associated with the capitalist modes of production; namely his friends
and family belonging to the urban elite population. The economic down-turn that resulted
from his policies motivated jobless educated Iranians to align against the monarchy. The
angered bazaaris funded and organized the Ulama against the Muhammad Reza Shah
because of their long history with the religious establishment essentially enabled them to
do so. Land owners enraged by the Shah organized with the rest of the population
affected by the economic reforms to help overthrow the Shah and restore stability and
income to a large population of the Iranian masses. Most Iranians felt that the Shah’s
policies were unjust and that they were based on increasing profit for his friends and
family rather than actually diversifying the economy and stabilizing the nation. This
perception, true or not is what Khomeini and other oppositional figured advocated to the
Iranian people. Although the Shah’s economic policies generally failed the Iranian people
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it is doubtful that his land reform policies were intended to make the agriculture sector
crash. His lack of economic expertise motivated him to focus on the industrial sector
instead of formulating the proper transition process needed to transform the nation from a
largely agrarian based society to one of industry.
Class Based Issues
The economic reforms policies that industrialized the economy caused a number of
class issues in Iran. The reforms produced a new land owning class out of nearly sixty
percent of the rural population, but the remaining forty percent of the rural populace not
given property through reforms became known as the new rural proletariat class (Maryam
Panah 2007, p. 28). The new rural proletariat was forced in to low wage labor and into
extremely poor living conditions. Many were forced to move to resettlement centers
created by the Shah’s land reform policies. The meager living conditions essentially
motivated a large segment of the rural proletariat to migrate to the cities for work but the
already fragile urban economy caused the unemployed labor force in the cities to expand.
The transfer to an industrialized economy caused a small urban proletariat and a large sub
proletariat population reliant on temporary jobs to emerge. The Shah created an unsightly
class based societal division between the traditional and modern segments of society as a
result of his efforts to modernize the nation. Instead of equally distributing reform by
concentrating on renovating both the industry and agriculture sector, the Shah focused on
one and caused an imbalance in the nation’s class system. Power shifted from the hands
of the landed aristocracy and into the hands of the newly formed industrial based
aristocrats.
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The urban unemployed, including the rural population that migrated to the cities for
jobs, were alienated through poor living conditions shaped by the Shah’s reforms. High
housing costs and inflation motivated a large majority of unemployed and poor working
class Iranians to move into box towns or slums adjoining the city. Instead of considering
ways to resolve the unemployment predicament that led to the emergence of the shanty
towns, the Shah focused on demolishing the box towns in order to improve the visual
appearance of the cities parameters. By doing so the Shah created an even larger
opposition. The poor and unemployed members of society had more than enough reason
to be angry. Muhammad Reza Shah had completely changed the system without
considering the impact that such alternations would have on the population.. The influx
of unemployed migrants caused the cities to swell with poor, unemployed and generally
unskilled labor which therefore reinforced and expanded the Shah’s oppositional base.
The Shah appeared to have no resolution to the problem because he had not considered
the impact that his modernization efforts would have on nation that was mostly agrarianbased in nature.
The middle class urban population also suffered as a result of the Shah’s economic
reforms. Large segments of the educated middle class population were jobless because
the economy in Iran was simply failing. Only a small segment of the Iranian population
was benefiting from these reforms while most did not. Land owning clergy, educated
unemployed individuals, merchants, bankers, artisans and shopkeepers in the bazaars
were all significantly impacted by the reforms. Muhammad Reza attempted to modernize
the nation without providing the skills necessary to bring about the modernization
process, therefore a large majority of Iranians unskilled or un-needed in the industrial
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sector became unemployed. The Shah’s modernization policies created two distinct
segments within Iran; those that relied on traditional means to making income such as
farming, owning land, selling products in bazaars etc., while the modern segment of
society relied on banking, communications, modern shopping centers, teaching, and
modern based farming methods. This change in the class system exaggerated competition
between the two segments of society and caused even more opposition to the Shah’s
policies (Kamali 1998, pp. 166-170).
Severing Ties with the West
American presence in Iran in the late 1970’s led to the belief that the United States if
not fully responsible for the situation in Iran was at least partially to blame for the
economic turmoil caused by industrialization process (Keddie 1981, p. 273). That
widespread perception motivated Iranians to consider removing Western control over
Iranian resources and trade in order to increase the nation’s financial autonomy. Iranians
realized their natural resources were being exploited by Western powers such as the
United States and therefore began to perceive the West as simply an adversary to the
Iranian masses. This perception led to overwhelming dislike for foreign interference and
eventually motivated Iranians to consider severing the ties with the West.
After the coup of 1953, Muhammad Reza Shah came to the realization that social
mobilization in Iran was intensified by political groups wanting to take part in the
political process. Because political participation was necessary for the modernization
process, The Shah utilized a strategy founded on elite participation and the suppression of
all forms of opposition. Middle class participation was particularly suppressed because
the Shah considered those with communist and nationalist tendencies to be of greatest
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threat to Iran’s political stability. (Milani 1994, p.67) To counteract middle class political
participation the Shah focused on the promotion of economic growth for the lower
classes through economic concession and wage increases. By attempting to strengthen the
lower class segments of society, the Shah believed that he would essentially weaken the
middle class intellectuals that brought Mussadegh to power. The Shah, however, did not
realize that centering his efforts on suppressing nationalism and communism by
strengthening the lower classes would cause other segments of society to come forward
and confront the monarchy for its repressive policies.
Economic growth and modernization in Iran influenced social mobilization by
essentially eroding old psychological commitments. New ideas and modes of living
brought on by two decades of state sponsored modernization radically altered the
structure of the Iranian population (Milani 1994, p. 66). The largely agrarian and illiterate
Iranian population urbanized and became literate in a short span of time, therefore
exposing the Iranian masses to new ideas. A new set of ideas essentially motivated
Iranians to question the leadership structure of the nation and develop groups to combat
the repressive leadership style of the monarchy. Large scale transformations to the system
such as “commercialization, urbanization and industrialization” (Misagh Parsa, 1994, p.
135) eroded the traditional value system of the Iranian masses. Such changes to the
system enabled Iranians to build new ideological perspectives in regards to the political
system that were generally absent prior to the modernization process. Failed promises to
decentralize the economic and political structure of the nation led to the rise of opposition
groups (Keddie 2003, p. 214).
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Contending ideological perspectives clearly preformed an important role in the 1979
revolution; therefore understanding the roots of these ideological perspectives can allow
us to better understand political behavior in Iran. The diverse array of political ideologies
that surfaced prior to the revolution made the suppression of political activity by the Shah
more difficult. Iranians had multiple reasons for disliking the Shah’s policies; therefore
by concentrating on the two political groups believed to be of greatest threat to the
regime, the Shah enabled the growth of other oppositional groups. Although
ideologically these groups differed, the goal for most was generally the same. Removing
the Shah from power or reducing his control over the government was the central
objective for the political parties involved in the 1979 revolution.
Iranian Civil Society: Organization and Public Mobilization
Although civil society is generally described as a social sphere where “ … individuals
and groups interact and organize their social life”, civil society in Iran is centered more
on the group rather than the individual (Kamali 1998, p. 36). Ezatollah Sahhabi describes
civil society as: a society “in which all social groups-whether classes, cooperatives,
syndicates, or ideological groups can coexist together as members of the same national
society, have equality and equal opportunity to pursue their goals, where there is no
discrimination, and where political decisions are not the work of anyone individual, thus
there is no ideological or class hegemony, and if there are hegemonic tendencies, they are
kept in check by the larger society. Therefore there is no civil society in countries where
the wealthy control social affairs, even if they are advanced and there is a division of
labor. Civil society stands in contrast to discriminatory societies or places where there is
control by a single group or class”. (Mehran Kamrava 2001, p. 174) Some scholars view
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civil society in terms of “sacredness of personal property, the ability to improve society
and alleviate social alienation; the universal right to receive justice and to be heard, the
making of thought, science and rational: acquiring new and contemporary understanding
of the family and social class, freedom, and love; and where an attempt is made to foster
unity of thought both in one’s own community and the global society” (Mehran Kamrava
2001, p. 175). Alireza Alavi-Tabar and Majid Muhammadi define civil society “ as a
collection of (social) organizations that are independent of the government and have their
own internal dynamics” (Mehran Kamrava 2001, p. 175). I define civil society as
nongovernmental groups or organizations that are formed to improve the societal,
political and economic environment. Therefore, civil society groups tend to emerge when
the values of a society differ from values of those managing the nation. In the case of
Iran, civil society groups emerged during the Nasser Ad Din Shah Era to respond to the
Shah’s bad economic and political policies that drained the life out of the nation’s
economy and rendered Iran powerless in the global system. When leaders such as
Mozzafar Ad Din Shah lessened control of the nation, civil society groups were able to
better coordinate and respond to the issues of the political atmosphere. During such
periods, groups were able to expand and new groups were able to emerge.
In Iran, civil society is comprised of a combination of social, political and religious
groups that are not necessarily shaped to persuade political outcomes in the system but
often do. As a nongovernmental group, the religious establishment has enjoyed a great
deal of influence in the political sphere of Iran. The theological basis of the Ulama’s
social authority comes from the nation’s history of political order pre-Islamic and Islamic
Iran both maintained a certain sense of external hierarchal political order legitimized
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through divine order (Kamali 1998, p. 39). Therefore, the religious establishment in Iran,
although not explicitly part of the leadership system, has held a great deal of political
authority. One can see the emergence of this political authority during the Sassanid Era
and its continuity over time. Civil society in Iran has differed from the West in that it is
“civic sphere of local communities, the bazaaris, Muslim individuals, and the Ulama
where the Ulama have a leading position” (Kamali 1998, p. 43). A number of groups,
such as the bazzaris, socialist, communist, educated elites, and peasants, influenced the
Iranian revolution of 1979, however, the religious establishment being one of the most
developed and organized segments of Iranian civil society appears to have had the
greatest impact on the political transformation that Iran encountered. A general dislike for
the Shah pushed various segments of civil society to invoke political change through a
process of collaboration. After the 1953 coup, much of the secular political groups
responsible for changing the political system were disbanded by the Shah, therefore “at
the time, the political opposition had no option remaining but to mobilize within the
mosque and religious structures” (Parsa 1994, p. 136). Because the religious
establishment was generally more organized than other segments of civil society,
oppositional groups essentially utilized the institution to organize political resistance.
Revolutionary Forces
After the coup of 1953 most of the political groups involved in bringing Mussadegh to
power were diffused by the Shah in order to eliminate political competition for the
monarchy. Shifting support for political leaders such as Mussadegh also weakened
political parties within the nation as is evident from the Tudeh parties waxing and waning
support for Mussadegh. A clear fragmentation among political party’s that opposed the
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Shah made the process of disbanding such ideologically diverse groups much simpler.
Some scholars believe that political parties in Iran were also easy to disband because
personal differences within the leadership structure of such groups made the process
relatively easy (Jahangir Amuzegar 1991, p. 108). To counter political competition to the
monarchy, a number of unsuccessful political groups were created by the Shah in the late
1950’s, however, rivalry within the royal parties that resulted in election fraud eventually
put an end to the political parties created to present an image of pluralistic political
competition. The reality was far from such as the Shah had no tolerance for political
competition and used extremely repressive methods to weaken his opponents.95
The Shah’s tyrannical policies were unable to eradicate the roots of displeasure
against his regime. The repression radicalized opposition by intensifying denunciation of
the government. Oppositional groups managed to organize but had little success in
transforming the system. A series of Marxist groups motivated by the guerrilla
movements in Latin America became popular in Iran as did new nationalist and Islamist
groups focused on institutional change. Political groups in Iran prior to the revolution
were generally categorized as either nationalist, Leftist, or Islamist. And while not all
oppositional groups fell within these exact categorical divisions, oppositional groups
were certainly understood within the three broad ideological perspectives. The
nationalists, for instance, focused on economic independence and the Persian identity as
the main focus of their mobilization. The Leftist groups on the other hand were centered
on socialist policies as well as economic independence for the nation. Islamist groups
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According to Milani (1994, p. 70) “... the single most significant reason for stability was the Shah’s
effective use of repression against perceived opponents. He relied on the might of the armed forces,
SAVAK, and his court, providing huge financial rewards to these pillars of society.” “In Iran SAVAK did
rely on atrocious ,methodsof torture “such as whipping, and beating, electric shock, and extraction of nails
and teeth, boiling water pumped up the rectum, heavy weights hung on the testicles, etc.”
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were concerned with renewing the religious establishment’s authority and restoring
Islamic values that the Shah had essentially overshadowed with his policies. During the
twentieth century politics in Iran had been centered on a competition for power among
the nationalist, communist, Islamist and the state. Although these groups were unable to
single-handedly change the system, the incremental changes they made through the
introduction of new ideological perspectives without a doubt enabled the revolution to
occur (Maziar Behrooz, 1999 p. xi). Due to the Shah’s tyrannical policies, however, the
nationalist and Islamist groups were most successful in invoking transformative change
in the Iranian system.
Leftist Groups
Marxist based ideologies gained popularity through the Iranian Marxist group known
as the Tudeh party. The Tudeh’s influence although relatively high while Reza Shah was
in power significantly declined by the time Muhammad Reza took over. The close
relationship in which Tudeh members had with the Soviet union also motivated a number
of Iranians to reduce support for the organization which helped nationalist groups such as
the National Front to gain popularity through a cohesion between the two groups . It is
important to note that the Iranian Marxists of the 60’s and 70’s differed from other leftists
groups of the time in that they adjusted their theories to align with the nation’s mass
culture. Iranian Marxists therefore embraced Islamic values to increase support for their
party. 96
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Dorraj explains the Marxist alignment with Islam through a statement made by Khosrow Golsorkhi “ I
am a Marxist-Lennist, but I deeply respect the teachings of Islam. In a court whose legality and jurisdiction
I do not recognize, I do not defend myself. As a Marxist, I speak to the masses and to history. The more
you persecute me, the more proud of myself I become; the more distant I am from you, the closer I am to
the people. The more you hate me and my ideas, the more I am loved and adored by the masses. Even if
you bury me, as I am sure you will, my corpse will inspire banners and songs” (1990., p. 118).
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The Tudeh party’s power however waxed and waned over time, leading to the
emergence of new leftist based organizations. The Shah’s repressive policies changed the
way in which oppositional movements operated within the regime therefore Marxist
based groups moved toward constructing underground organizations that would be more
difficult to find and diffuse. Instead of the largely peaceful methods of protests in which
the Tudeh party had used in the past, Marxist groups, such as the Jangalis, believed that
armed struggle would be the way to achieve political salvation (Milani 1994, p. 77).
Various Marxist guerilla groups eventually joined to form the Fada’iyun –e Khalq but the
Shah’s secret police used torture to locate and kill a large number of the Fada’iyun
members. An ideological split in regards to the success of the guerilla tactics utilized by
the party eventually caused the group to split into two factions by the mid 1970’s. Some
of the Fada’iyun members pushed for educating the masses while others focused on
guerilla warfare (Milani 1994, p. 77). The ideological split between Marxist groups
essentially inhibited the Left from transforming the political system.
Nationalist Opposition
The National Front was the most successful political movement in Iran because of its
ability to organize the Iranian masses during the constitutional revolution. While the
Shah focused on suppressing the group; the organization formed an ideological split that
caused the political movement to splinter. After the 1953 coup, the National Front
divided into two segments; one that supported a secular perspective and one that moved
toward a more religious ideological perspective. The Shah suppressed the nationalists
but those that escaped after the 1953 coup continued underground political activities in
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Iran.97 For that reason, the Shah specifically focused on containing the expansion of
nationalist groups in Iran and by doing so caused Islamic nationalist oppositional groups
to expand.
The Third National Front organization formed in the 1960’s had moved toward a
more religious perspective as a means to mobilize the masses. (Mehran Kamrava 1990, p.
59). Individuals such as Mehdi Bazzargan, Ali Shariati and Jalal Al-e Ahmad focused on
promoting Shia political thought in order to neutralize Western hegemony in Iran. They
believed that by doing so they could “end the endemic alienation of educated Iranians and
protect the country’s identity and heritage” (Milani 1994, p. 78). Such individuals used
Iranian nationalism and Shi’ism to build a link between Shi’ism and the secular
intelligentsia; an alliance that would be necessary for achieving transformative change.
By moving toward a more religious perspective however, the National Front organization
suffered. A political party known as the Liberation Movement did however remain
relatively active in the 1970’s. The Liberation movement led by Dr. Bazargan focused on
the synthesis between Islam and politics and promoted its ideology through lectures and
debates sponsored by the organization. The Liberation Movement, although clearly active
in Iran, was far more successful in activities overseas. By promoting anti-regime
propaganda to expatriates and Iranians studying oversees the group was able to grow but
after a period of time ideological fragmentation oversees caused the Liberation
Movement to split into the Confederation of Iranian Students and the Islamic Students
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According to Milani The National Front was essentially divided, one group supported secular
transformation while the other focused on changing the Iranian political system by religious means. These
groups most operated over seas in Western Europe, North Africa and Lebanon and had ties to Bazargan as
well as Khomeini (1994, p. 78).
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Society. These groups continued to operate in Iran but their political influence remained
minimal (Milani 1994, p. 78).
Islamic Marxists
When the Tudeh and National Front parties were suppressed by the Shah a guerilla
organization known as the Mujahadeen was created to carry on where the two parties had
left off. The Mujahadeen was formed by previous Tudeh and National Front members
that had grown tired of the rather peaceful tactics that oppositional groups had grown
accustomed to. Members of the Mujahadeen believed that armed struggle was the only
way to achieve regime change and that the Iranian masses were ready to shed blood in
order to change the system.98 The SAVAK, however, imprisoned most of the
Mujahadeen’s leaders in order to impair oppositional activity. Some members of the
Mujahadeen moved toward a more Marxist based ideology while other members centered
on an Islamic based ideology. The division caused the Mujahadeen to split in to two
factions by the mid 1970’s and another split in the communist based segment of the
group left the Mujahadeen completely fragmented. Because of assassinations and
bombings by the Mujahadeen, the Shah further increased repression in order to diffuse
the two groups. A lack of ideological cohesion among the leaders of Mujahadeen caused
a sense of skepticism that aroused public suspicion about the party. This, like other
oppositional parties at the time, suffered as a result of the Shah’s repressive policies. The
Shah successfully imprisoned most of the remaining leaders responsible for opposition,
thereby reducing threat to the Iranian regime.
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Milani quotes a statement made by a Mujahadeen leader, expressing Iranian’s readiness to respond to the
injustice brought on by the Shah: “Our people, when they find a trustworthy leader, will not hesitate even
to shed their blood in order to destroy the reactionaries” (1990, p. 61).
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Islamic Nationalists
When the Shah’s tyranny nearly put an end to the political parties that developed in
the early 1900’s, new political outlooks and ideologies based on Islamic thought emerged
in the mid 1960’s. These new Islamic nationalist ideologies surfaced because secular
political principals were not only difficult to establish in an Islamic nation but also
because ideological splits within previous parties made them easy to disband. The
Intellectuals slowly realized that in order to change the political system they would need
a strong opposition backed by one of the most influential components of Iranian culture;
Shi’a Islam. In the past political resistance to the Shah remained secular in nature and
were typically based on foreign views of the political system. These ideas, however, had
little success in a nation with bonds to Islamic values. Intellectuals such as Shariati knew
that Shia Islam would have to be integrated into the political system in order to mobilize
the Iranian masses.
Public opposition to the Shah was largely ineffective up until the 1960’s because of
the fragmentation caused by ideological differences; however a number of intellectuals
altered the political atmosphere by unifying the nationalist and Islamist groups in order to
mobilize the Iranian masses. Intellectuals such as Ali Shariati, Jalal Al-e Ahmad and
Mehdi Bazargan and Abolhassan Banisadr paved the way for political transformation by
focusing on that link between Islam and politics; a move that political groups of the past
had little success in achieving. 99 These individuals were all intellectuals and all of them
were previously affiliated with oppositional groups disbanded by the Shah.
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These individuals were known for their intellectually formatted speeches and publications on Islam and
politics. Unlike members of the clerical establishment, Shariati, Al-e Ahmad and Bazargan were able to
connect to a much larger segment of the Iranian population.
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By partaking in oppositional activities, Shariati, Bazargan, Al-e Ahmad and Banisadr
had come to the realization that secular based resistance could not achieve transformative
change in a largely Islamic based environment such as Iran. Shariati emphasized the
political and revolutionary role of Islam as well as the social responsibility of
intellectuals through speeches to the public. By doing so he and others like him were able
to create a new set of ideas in regards to the Iranian political system. Shariati enabled
Iranians to realize the revolutionary based roots of their political culture and that they as a
community must overcome social and political injustice to transform the political system.
Shariati and Al-e Ahmad both believed that intellectuals “must become ‘socially
responsible’: they must inject a sense of self awareness into their society and must lead
its people in the direction of tawhid” (Kamrava 1990, p. 74). These individuals were
clearly under the impression that a political system founded on Islamic values would
have to be integrated into the Iranian political system in order to establish stability within
the Iranian system. Intellectuals such as Shariati, Bazargan, Al-e Ahmad and Banisadr
made the revolution a reality by advocating the transformative elements of Shi’ism into
the Iranian political system. These individuals built a bridge between two very different
ideological perspectives to facilitate transformative change within the Iranian system.
Islamist Opposition
The clerical establishment also wanted to politicize Islam, however, the Ulama wanted
to do so in order to strengthen their role in Iran, whereas the intellectuals did so because
they not only believed that Islam would remedy the political, social and economic
problems of the nation but also because they had come to the realization that there was no
other means to mobilize the masses other than through Islam. Individuals, such as
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Ayatollah Morteza Mottahari, gave speeches and published works on the importance of
“social, political, and Islamic values” (Kamrava 1990, p. 78). By urging people to
become active in the social and political affairs of the nation, Mottahari and other clerics
like him brought on a level of political participation that undoubtley clashed with the
monarchy's absolutism. Knowing that such speeches and publications would encourage
public opposition, the Shah promptly cracked down on the Ulama by shutting down
various religious centers in Iran. The Shah escalated opposition by the Ulama through
his actions which enabled public opposition to further expand.
The Shah’s actions toward the Ulama in the 1960’s gave way to a new more
politically active group of Ulama. Religious figures such as Ayatollah Khomeini were
frustrated with the Shah’s behavior toward the Ulama and therefore went after the Shah
for his actions. The political dimension that Khomeini brought to the scene was not
necessarily innovative because intellectuals such as Shariati had been advocating such
ideas prior to Khomeini coming to power; however his charismatic personality is what
distinguished him from other political figures of that time. Instead of simply focusing his
mobilization tactics on members of the religious establishment, he went straight to the
people of Iran. By dispensing taped lectures to the people of Iran he essentially rekindled
the link between Islam and politics that had been lost as result of Reza Shah’s
secularization policies.100 Until then, Iranians simply followed the works of intellectuals
but lacked the leadership approach needed to motivate mass public mobilization.
100

“Tapes of Khomeini’s sermons and speeches passed through the mosque network from his residence in
Iraq to Qom, Iran’s most holy city and the Ayatollah’s home until his exile. From there, they were taken to
other cities, where enterprising and friendly bazaar merchants duplicated tapes and sold them to the
faithful. Beginning in 1976 the mosque network eliminated the middleman and delivered the cassettes and
pamphlets which revolutionary doctrine directly to the sympathetic mullahs. They in turn passed it to the
people in the mosques” (Stempel 1981, p. 45). Because of the relatively quiet and organized method of
transferring Khomeini’s revolutionary based lectures, the process went relatively unnoticed until the 1977.
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Ayatollah Khomeini was the charismatic leader that Iranians had been looking for. His
ability to emotionally arouse the population by advocating social justice through an
Islamic value system enabled him to gain popularity among the Iranian masses.
The intellectuals built the ideological fusion that necessary for changing the system and
Khomeini used that readiness to his advantage by quickly mobilizing the masses to
overthrow the Shah. His success was due to his charismatic personality that stimulated
the Iranian masses into an angry mob of individuals, ready to fight and possibly die with
the intention of restoring the elements of justice and social equality that the Shah was
believed to have taken away from them.
Conclusion
A series of modernization reforms and a reduction in repression led to the
mobilization of the Iranian society. Although unable to agree on how the political system
should be operated, oppositional groups could no longer withstand the Shah’s absolutism.
Economic and land based reforms intended to create a support base for the Shah
backfired. By forcing land owners to sell their property to the government the Shah
created a new group of enemies out of the traditional land owning segments of society.
The Shah also amplified his oppositional base by selling land to peasants without
formulating a plan to develop the agriculture sector. The unlucky individuals unable to
receive loans for land and unable to work on farms due to high inflation and low wages
were forced to move to the cities for work but only added to the millions of unemployed
urban portions of society. Iran at the time could be described as a nation divided in terms
of modernity and traditionalism, suffering from economic turmoil, political repression,
and foreign economic domination, unequal distribution of wealth and alienation. The
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policies created by the Shah completely ran counter to the Iranian value system. By
trying to secularize and modernize Iranians through Western based economic and
development plans the Shah, in essence, alienated a large majority of the Iranian masses.
The Ulama were angered for various reasons such as land reform, changes to voting
rights, secularization of the education system and the Shah’s general behavior toward the
religious establishment. The Bazzari on the other hand were frustrated by high taxation,
the creation of modern shopping centers and accusations of price fixing. Rural peasants
were angered by land reform laws that enabled them to buy land but provided them with
little opportunity to financially grow. Unemployed rural landless segments of society
were clearly frustrated with the imbalance in the system that left with them with nothing.
Educated modern middle class segments of society were angered by political repression
and lack of jobs. Iranians were generally tired of foreign influence and ready for Iran to
sever it’s ties with the West. Those who benefited from the Shah’s policies were a clear
minority in Iran therefore Iranian frustration with the system ultimately led to systemic
transformation through revolution.
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CHAPTER 5
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC
The longer an authoritarian regime stays in power the less likely it is the political
system becomes democratic through mass mobilization (Chehabi 1995 p. 35) Although
assembling the oppositional masses is generally the best way to remove non-democratic
regimes, the transition typically results in “bloody repression” or complete success by the
opposition, which again reduces the chance of introducing democratic procedures into the
political system (p. 35). When power is seized by the opposition rather than transferred
through more peaceful measures, the likelihood of instilling democratically based
institutions is much lower because political tension caused by the violence and repression
generally results in repressive based tactics by the new leaders in order to quiet the
oppositional masses. This was the exact situation in Iran immediately following the
revolution of 1979. The revolution, although geared toward removing absolutism, only
enhanced authoritarianism. To maintain control of Iran and deter further political
participation on behalf of the enraged masses, Khomeini increased repression by
immediately commissioning the formation of a new constitution.
Adoption of a New Constitution
Khomeini assembled a provisional government to help “undertake the political, social,
and economic restructuring of post revolutionary Iranian society” (Riaz Hassan 1984, p.
676). The provisional government was comprised of a large majority of individuals from
the Liberation Movement but those in charge of restructuring Iran were largely members
of the Islamic faction of the Liberation Movement. Although the provisional government
was set to restructure the nation, various groups such as Khomeini’s own Revolutionary
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Council, the Mujahadeen, the Revolutionary guards and the Komiteh all formed
obstacles to prevent such changes (p.677). Eventually the Revolutionary Council became
provisional government main rival and kept the government from achieving its goal of
creating a balanced government. In 1980 the provisional government was commissioned
to draft a new Iranian constitution and did so within a time span of just over six months.
The constitution was quickly approved by Khomeini and adopted by the revolutionary
council with only minor amendments (P. 681). Khomeini and the clerics in the
Revolutionary council wanted the constitution to be put to a referendum but this was
opposed by members of he provisional government because of the difficulty involved in
saying either yes or no to the entire one hundred seventy article constitution. Khomeini,
The Religious Council and the provisional government eventually compromised and
decided to place the constitution before the parliament for its approval and then put the
Parliament’s decision to the referendum.
Because an Islamic government based solely on Islamic law is inadequate for modern
political systems and largely inconsistent with modern day issues, Muslim countries such
as Iran have had little choice but to integrate modern and generally Western based legal
theories with traditional Islamic legal principles (Mehran Tamadonfar 2001, p. 205). A
number of Muslims blame the social and political problems that Muslim countries face
today as a result of integrating these two very different philosophies. Therefore, a
majority of Islamists believe that such nations must move away from Western
philosophies and back to Islamic legal principles in order to restore stability and solve the
social and political problems that plague the Muslim nations of today (2001, p. 205). A
vast majority of Iranians believed that the nation would stabilize by restoring Islamic
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based values and set out to change the system, only to find that the leader of the
revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini had no intention of limiting his leadership capacity to
Islamic based legal principles as he had claimed to do, Khomeini was simply a dictator
like the leader before him. The new constitution is proof that Khomeini and the Ulama’s
initial desire to Islamize the legal system and the nation has transformed into a system
centered on maintaining control over the nation instead.
Vilayat-e-Faqih
Tension between the Islamic intellectuals and the traditional Ulama emerged
immediately following the revolution because of a series of ideological differences
between the two groups. To reduce conflict, Khomeini quickly commissioned the
provisional government to draft a constitution for the newly formed government. A draft
of the constitution was submitted to Khomeini for approval and adopted by the
revolutionary council soon after.101 The parliamentary elections that followed the creation
of the constitution gave a large majority of the parliamentary seats to clerics from the
Islamic Republican Party.102 The win enabled the clerics to make fundamental changes to
the constitution by inserting a number of articles regarding the Velayat-e-Faqih.103

101
The Revolutionary Council is a group of clerics and experts selected by Khomeini to oversee the Islamic
revolution and legal aspects of the interim government.
102
The Islamic Republican Party or IRP’s central goal was to represent the political needs of the Ulama
(Said Saffari, 1993, p 65).
103

“During the occultation of the Lord of age the governance and leadership of the nation devolve upon the
just and pious faqih who is acquainted with the circumstances of his age, courageous, resourceful and
possessed of administrative ability ; and recognized and accepted by the majority of the people. In the event
that no faqih should be recognized by the majority, the leaders or the leadership council composed of
fuqaha possessing the afformented qualifications will assume this responsibility in accordance with article
107” (Riaz Hassan, 1984, p. 682).
The Velayat- e Faqih translates to guardianship of the jurisprudent. This term essentially explains the role
in which Shia clergy have in regards to controling the matters of the state and the people. Some members of
the religious establishment believe that the Valayet – e Faqih does not give absolute power to Ulama while
figures such as Khomeini and his followers disagree. The constitution however created a position within
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Article Five enabled Khomeini to be the absolute leader of the Islamic Republic while
Article 110 gave the Valie-e-Faqih power to dismiss commanders of the armed forces
and Revolutionary Guards, declare war and peace, to approve presidential candidates and
dismiss them if such action would be in the best interest of the nation ( Hassan, 1982,
682). This essentially made the president subordinate to the faqih and largely made it a
symbolic position in the newly established Islamic Republic (Milani 1993, p. 362). The
Islamic intellectuals that helped bring Khomeini to power absolutely resented the actions
that leaders of the regime had taken in order to retain control of the nation. Bazargan and
other members of the provisional revolutionary government opposed the changes made
by the Ulama because it brought back the absolutism that Iranians had hoped to eliminate
through revolutionary transformation. Khomeini slowly dismissed government officials
affiliated with the Liberation Movement and replaced them with members of the Ulama
that supported his actions and desire for absolute power.
The Iranian Constitution and the amendments made to it by the Ulama were simply an
attempt to centralize power within the regime. A large number of contradictions within
the constitution are proof that the legal document was created to serve the interests of
those that held powerful positions within the regime. Although the Iranian Constitution
provides for secularly rooted principles such as rights, equality, and justice, it also
“acknowledges the supremacy of restrictive Islamic views on rights, justice, and
equality” (Tamadonfar 2001, p. 206). Although the constitution recognizes the
sovereignty of God by claiming that God has absolute power over man and the world and

the political system that bestowed this form of absolute power to the leader of the revolution himself,
Ayatollah Khomeini.
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that man is in charge of his own “social destiny” (p. 206), a section following that
statement contradicts the claim by arguing that sovereignty of God is exercised on Earth
by members of the Shi’a Clergy (p. 206). The verbiage in the newly formed constitution
monopolized power to the Islamic clergy by restricting individual rights. The Iranian
Constitution gave clerics the ability to govern based on the interests of the regime rather
than the needs of the Iranian population, therefore it becomes clear that maintaining
political control is far more important to the leaders of the regime than aligning with an
Islamic based value system.
Islamization of Laws
Khomeini changed the legal structure of the state by Islamizing the laws. The idea was
to resist Western legal theories and move toward a more Islamic-based traditional legal
system by removing Western influence. Some Iranians believed that returning to Islamic
based laws was the answer to the nation’s problems while others believed the issues that
plagued Iran were generally due to the authoritarian leadership style that dominated
Iran’s history. Khomeini and his followers advocated an Islamic based legal system by
codifying the Sharia and Fiqh to construct such a legal structure within Iran.104 The
problem, however, is that the Islamic Republic’s government has been selective in
choosing which segments of the Sharia to enforce. Laws are clearly slanted in favor of
those who are in power through codes that limit the organization and expansion of other
political groups. Media control by the Islamic Republican Party and Islamic
Revolutionary Guards ensures that oppositional groups are suppressed (Hassan, 1984, p.
684). Laws that help maintain the regimes authority are generally enforced more
104

Islamic law consists of two main components: The Sharia which is based on two primary sources, the
sayings of Muhammad and the revelations within the Quran and The Fiqh which is comprised of
interpretations of the Sharia by Muslim Jurists (Tamadonfar, 2001, p. 209).
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forcefully in order to ensure the regime’s stability. Therefore, laws in Iran are based
mainly on ensuring those in powerful government positions maintain their authority
through all possible means. Revolutionary based behavior or any form of opposition to
the government is perceived as a threat and therefore illegal under Iranian law.
Laws in the Islamic Republic are generally geared toward power maintenance rather
than enforcing a truly Muslim based value system. This type generally normal outcome
of revolutionary transformation because when power is seized, leaders must increase
repression to stop opposition in order to construct a new leadership system (Chehabi,
1990). What started off as a religiously based nationalist framework for operating the
state turned into an ideologically rooted mechanism for control. Again, the likelihood of
choosing another method of control is not only slim but generally impossible given the
circumstances that Khomeini and his followers were facing at the time. The laws initiated
by the constitution were said to be Islamic and rooted in Islamic values when in reality
they were founded to help the Ulama maintain political control of the nation rather than
eliminating absolutism.
Economic and Social Policies
Economic policies in the Islamic Republic have been generally based on nationalizing
natural resources and redistributing land and jobs throughout nation. Private property was
considered sacred to Islam therefore Khomeini made sure Iranians were aware of the
importance of private ownership by issuing an Eight Point Declaration on property rights.
Through this measure, authorities were told to respect people’s “movable and immovable
possessions, including homes, stores, workshops, farms and factories” (Abrahamian,
2008, p. 179). Although Khomeini preached to Iranians that property rights were sacred
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to Islam he ended up confiscating large amounts of agricultural business land run by
leaders of the Pahlavi regime and later distributing it to poor peasant families. Khomeini
focused on helping the peasant population and bringing a sense of self sufficiency to a
segment of the Iranian society that was neglected by the Shah, therefore various aspects
of his reform measures were beneficial to the Iranian population. The government also
focused on a number of labor related laws to ensure factory workers rights. Various
unions were formed and limits were placed on the amount of hours worked per week.
Attendance in elementary schools rose by nearly thirty percent, infant mortality rates
dropped by nearly eighty percent, the population nearly doubled within a ten year span
and literacy more than doubled by 1989 (2008, p. 180).
Social Policies in Iran changed significantly after the revolution. Institutions
promoting Western based culture such as cinemas were either closed or burned down to
suppress Western influence (Keddie 2003, p. 290) All types of music except Iranian folk
and classical music was also banned. The government implemented policies to separate
the sexes but the most notable changes were in regards to women’s rights (p. 291). The
Islamic Republic implemented policies that forced women to cover their hair with veils
and their body’s with large loose fitting coats to hide their figures. In the first year of the
revolution, Iranian women were treated poorly through laws that essentially took private
and publicly rooted rights away from women. Iranian women’s organizations however
did their best to change such laws and were largely successful at doing so. Although
women are still required to obtain permission for travel, wear Hejabs and loose fitting
coats on top of their clothing, they have certainly gained a significant amount of power in
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the Iranian political system through a series of laws aimed at increasing the rights of
women.
Foreign Policy
Foreign policy in the Islamic Republic was initially characterized by a period of
general disconnect from the global system. While in the process of systemic
transformation Iran cut ties with the West for a number of years to prove that the Islamic
Republic was capable of sufficiently providing for its population, without being reliant on
the Western world. Although the decision to cut financial ties with the West was certainly
viewed by Iranians as a positive move toward gaining autonomy, the decision to do so
has brought a multitude of problems for the nation. The Iranian government has come
under scrutiny for reducing ties with the West as well as a series of human rights related
issues that appear to be prevalent within the Islamic regime. Although Iran has enjoyed
relatively smooth relations with Eastern countries such China and India, sanctions
implemented by the West have certainly strained relations with those nations as well.
Besides Iran’s relationship with Iraq, Iran has generally had a peaceful relationship with
its neighboring nations.The regime’s desire to bring a sense of self sufficiency to Iran has
generally worked, but its continued behavior toward The United States and Israel is
beginning to backfire. The regimes continuous support of militant Islamist groups such as
Hezbelloh has painted the government as merely an outlet for funding terrorist opposition
to Israel and Western based domination. This image has not only hurt the Iranian trade
industry by sanctions imposed by West but also limited the financial and social growth of
the nation. Iranians, however, seem to believe that the Islamic Republic’s behavior
toward the West is generally acceptable. Ahmadinejad has received a great deal of
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support from the Supreme Leader for vocalizing his opposition …” to so called arrogant
outside powers (especially the United States)” (Thaler et. al, 2010, p. 77). Iranians
continue to believe that subservience to the West is simply unacceptable, and the regime
continues its reclusive behavior that was adopted in 1979 with a certain amount of
support from the Iranian population.
Regimes Actions toward Various Founders of Revolution
A number of groups initially involved in the revolutionary process such as the
Mujahadeen and the Liberation movement were phased out of power by Khomeini
because of the potential threat they posed to the ulama’s political authority. The
provisional government’s Prime Minister, Mehdi Bazargan, realized within a short period
of time that Khomeini had no intention of distributing power among the various political
groups that were responsible for carrying out the revolution. Khomeini replaced members
of the provisional government with clerics from the Islamic Republican Party and various
other Islamic based sectors created and endorsed by Khomeini himself. Through his
actions, Khomeini created opposition, but also suppressed it by utilizing the newly
formed Revolutionary Guards. Khomeini focused on the negative aspects of foreign
influence to motivate the masses to align with him, but a large majority of the
revolutionary forces involved in the transformation continued to support the less religious
and less centralized political system. The Liberation Movement tried to remove the
clerical monopoly over religion by attempting to synthesize “mild features of European
socialism with progressive ideas of Shia Islam, and the advantages of industrial
technology with the cultural value of their own traditional society” (Hassan, 1984, p.
679). The Liberation Movement’s intent was to formulate a more progressive form of
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Shi’ism that could be accepted by the anti-Shah clergy, junior clergy, the modern middle
class and the dissatisfied intelligentsia (1984, p. 679). Khomeini, however, believed that
Bazargan and the Liberation Movement were far too radical for the Iranian system. In
1981 Dr. Abu Hassan Bani Sadr, a member of the Liberation Movement, was dismissed
as president of the provisional government and replaced with a member of the Islamic
Republican Party. Because of the provisional government’s opposition to Article five of
the constitution, Khomeini made it his priority to remove such figures from office and
replace them with conservative clerics that aligned more with his own ideology.
Shift to a Military Authoritarian System: The Pasdaran
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards, known as the Pasdaran, was created in May of
1979 to suppress opposition to the revolution. The institution that began as an
unorganized and generally poor militia formed by non-clerical supporters of the Islamic
regime transformed into a highly centralized institution with a great deal of political
autonomy.105 As an organization completely separate from the Iranian military, the
Pasdaran were forced to rely on volunteer support from non-clerical supporters of the
regime as well as funding through contributions from the clerical establishment.
Although not officially affiliated with the Iranian military, the Pasdaran was combined
with the Iranian military for a number of years. A separation, however, was maintained
throughout most of the institution’s history. Today the Pasdaran is a highly funded
institution with a great deal of autonomy. Leaders of the Pasdaran, although
ideologically aligned with conservative clerics, have a great deal of influence in the
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One can see that the Pasdaran has a great deal of autonomy from the Islamic Republican Party and other
institutions within the regime because throughout its existence leaders of the Pasdaran had generally
decided the composition of the insitution with little input from outside sources (Keneth Katzman, 1993, p.
116).
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political process within Iran. By utilizing volunteer support through its Basiji units, the
Pasdaran is more powerful than it has ever been.106 Internal opposition to the regime in
Iran is typically suppressed through support form the Basiji while export of the revolution
is generally handled by the Qods unit of the Pasdaran.107 The Qods unit is currently
responsible for exporting the revolution through financial and arms support in Lebanon,
Iraq, Afghanistan and various other nations. Domestically and internationally, the
Pasdaran has expanded into a large institution with members also associated with the
leadership structure of the nation.
Privatization of Religion
The politicization of religion that resulted from the establishment of a religious based
regime has changed the practice of religion in Iran. By politicizing Islam, Iranians have
moved away from attending Friday prayer for religious purposes to more private ways of
observing their religious duties (Abdolmohammad Kazemipur and Ali Rezaei p. 352)
Friday prayer in Iran has become a political duty that enables political growth and
maintenance of leadership positions. Studies show that public participation in events such
as Friday prayer have gone down for individuals that attended more often in the past (p.
352). Those in opposition to the regime have found that the political elements are what
dominate the so called religious discussions of clerics during Friday prayer. Many
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“The Basiji were relatively young (school age) and old (retired) volunteers who served a three-month
tours at the front and returned back to their villages” (Kenneth Katzman, 1993, p. 396). “ The Basiji were
not organized in fixed formation but rather were sent to the front en masse, where they were inserted into
fixed Pasdaran units on short notice, at direction of their Pasdaran commanders” (p. 396). The Basiji were
an integral part of the Iraq offensive but their inexperience and general use of them as simply unarmed,
untrained bodies led to a large causalities in which the military opposed.
107
The Qods unit “which is staffed by the most radical pasdars, became operational in 1982 when a
Pasdaran contingent arrived in Lebanon, ostensibly to help repel the Israeli invasion of that country earlier
that year. The unit primarly refers to Iran’s Lebanon contingent, the flagship of the Pasdaran’s export of the
revolution apparatus but also includes Pasdaran contingents in Sudan, and apparently Bosnia, as well as
intelligent and anti-dissident operations abroad” (Katzman, 1993, p. 396).
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Iranians closely associated with the leadership mechanism publicize their religion to gain
the support of the religious establishment. By doing so, Iranians affiliated with those in
power strengthen their bonds with the religious establishment and therefore enable their
own political, social and economic success.
The 2009 Election Dispute
Reformists have continued to push for political influence in Iran, however, their
success has been limited since president Mohhamad Khatami was replaced by the very
conservative president Mahmud Ahmadinejad. While in power Khatami enabled civil
society to grow by encouraging freedoms that the Islamic Republic had taken away from
Iranians. Ahmadinejad, however, perceived the previous leader’s (president Khatami)
reforms as barriers to the regime’s stability and therefore pushed for more government
control. Iranians that wanted Ahmadinejad out of the political arena put their financial
and physical support in campaigning for a new reformist president.
President Ahmadinejad’s disputed election in 2009 intensified opposition to the
regime. Although a large segment of the Iranian population appears to believe that
Ahmadinejad may have won the election against reformist opponent Mir- Hossein
Musavi, many believe the government’s desire to hide election data raises doubts
regarding the legitimacy of Ahmadinejad’s selection. Ahmadinejad’s economic policies,
which are aimed at helping the lower income strata, has enabled him to gain the support
of poor and more conservative segments of the Iranian population (Arshin AdibMoghaddam, 2006, p. 667). The Iranian population is changing however as Iranians are
beginning to question whether Ahmadinejad’s policies are worth enduring an increase in
government repression. Reformists clearly believe that the conservative segments of the
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Iranian leadership have taken these policies of repression too far for too long. Reformists
in Iran and abroad have come to the consensus that the Iranian government’s behavior
toward street protesters in 2009 was simply unacceptable and took the absolutist nature of
the regime too far. It appears that reformists such as Musavi have become a burden to the
Islamic Republic. The government’s desire to eliminate opposition through violence and
oppression has caused a new wave of opposition to emerge.
Re-emergence of Oppositional Groups
Oppositional groups are remerging again within the Iranian political atmosphere.
Those angered by the regime are joining reform organizations in hopes of removing the
clerical establishment’s absolute power over the domestic and foreign policies of the
nation. Liberal Islamists are again frustrated with the absolutist structure of the leadership
apparatus in Iran, and it appears they are merging once again to alter the system and bring
a sense of representation to the Iranian masses. Iranians are generally disappointed at how
the wealth of those affiliated with the regime continues to grow while the economy in
Iran remains stagnant. Educated Iranians unable to find jobs are moving in the direction
of reform because the economy in Iran is simply incapable of sustaining the large
educated population that has emerged.
Political competition through increased mass communication is motivating candidates
to seek the support of the Iranian masses rather than simply appeasing the Supreme
Leader and the Council of Experts. Public opinion is starting to matter more and more
each day as a result of increased communicative ability, which is the main reason why
censorship in Iran has become prevalent in more recent years (Adib-Moghaddam, 2006,
pp.666-68).
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Reformist groups appear to have gained popularity in more recent times as a result of
an increase in repression and economic instability that has caused dissatisfaction among
the largely young population of Iran. Maintenance of the theocratic regime is getting
more difficult as time passes and because of that government endorsed cruelty toward the
masses has increased to help the regimes continuity. High unemployment and general
lack of freedom has reproduced a political atmosphere nearly identical to that of the mid
to late 1970s. A lack of tolerance for opposition groups on behalf of the government has
caused a heightened dislike for the regime but this regime, unlike the Shah’s, has a large,
highly centralized and wealthy institution which was deliberately formed to suppress
such opposition. The Pasdaran’s ability to utilize discrete forces such as the Basiji to
control the Iranian masses has completely enraged Iranians pushing for reform. The
regime’s relative independence has enabled it to overlook foreign disapproval for its
actions and therefore pressure from the outside to weaken the authoritative nature of the
regime has been relatively unsuccessful. Iranians aware of the regime’s ability to
withstand foreign pressure are slowly beginning to coordinate opposition with the
realization that they will be responsible for implementing change. The regime’s
authoritative nature has proven its resilience to foreign demands and so Iranians are
becoming aware that it will be their responsibility to set forth transformative measures
with limited foreign assistance. Iranians in favor of reform are receiving a great deal of
moral and financial support from expatriates to push for reform but ultimately Iranians
within Iran will be responsible for instigating change.
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The Cyclical Process of Politics in Iran
Over the last century Iranian politics has gone through a cyclical pattern. Leaders
competing with the Iranian masses for power have increased repression and cruelty in
order to maintain authority but have instead are created even more resistance through
such tactics. A lack of legitimacy normally drives the need for repression but the vocal
nature of the Iranian masses certainly contributes to the repressive nature that Iranian
leaders of the last century have possessed. It appears that Iranians are culturally much
less willing to accept government endorsed brutality because their value system
essentially forbids them from doing so. When repression increases, oppositional
mobilization on behalf of the Iranian masses tends to increase as well. A decrease in
repression permits the growth of civil society which in turn increases political
participation and opposition to the regime. Iranian leaders therefore increase repression to
control the masses and continually add to the population’s dislike for the regime. The
recent election disputes are proof of this argument. Khatami’s liberalization measures
enabled civil society to flourish, but when Ahmadinejad came to power and suppressed
the people through various policies aimed at increasing the regime’s power, the Iranian
masses again pushed for reform. As a result those in power increased censorship and
banned political websites to reduce communication and therefore reduce or hopefully
eliminate political opposition. The Reformist attempting to gain political influence are
basically pushed out of the political arena or violently removed by members of the
Pasdaran to help maintain the regime, but this behavior only makes the cycle of
repression and opposition continue.
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Conclusion
The events of the last century serve as evidence that when met with authoritative
control and injustice, Iranians revolt. An inability to explain this revolutionary behavior
through simple classical approaches linked to economic instability and alienation leads to
a belief that economic issues are simply not sufficient in explaining such a response on
behalf of the Iranian population. Although economic problems have certainly had partial
influence on the revolutionary behavior Iranians posses, their values are more diverse
than applying a simple Marxist approach to the issue. It appears that Iranians are more
concerned with social justice, Islamic and nationalist values and the symbolic history of
the monarchy than they are with strictly economic based issues. Post-Marxist approaches
such as World System based theories, which focus on the role of the global economy in
promoting revolutionary behavior, appear to lack the ability to explain why Iranians of
varying income brackets would revolt. Functionalist approaches oversimplify the cause
of revolution to a simple issue of resource allocation but their reductionist approach lacks
the details necessary for explaining revolutionary transformation. Patterns of protest and
rebellion found in Iranian political behavior lead to a belief that Iranians have numerous
revolutionary based elements within their culture. The values that construct this
revolutionary behavior in Iran appear to be best explained through a cultural approach to
revolutionary transformation. The monarchic system, nationalist beliefs, Shi’a political
culture and a general desire for justice all appear to be the elements that promote the
boycotts, protests and revolutions that Iranians have encountered within their history.
The clerical establishment’s desire to maintain authority has shifted the focus of the
Islamic regime to one of only power retention. Maintenance of the regime’s authoritative
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structure appears to be the focal point of the regime’s policies. The leadership has
marginalized Islamic values in order to strengthen its authority but most religious
segments of society are beginning to realize that the regime has moved away from Islam
and toward authoritarianism. Arresting, beating, and killing people in the name of Islam
appears to be less accepted by the Iranian masses. The reason for this is that Iranians that
truly believe in the values that Islam promotes, know that those in power pick and choose
the segments of Islamic law that enable them to stay in power rather than adhering to all
components of the religion that could limit leadership authority.
Iranians have been protesting for a long period of time but now this behavior is simply
unacceptable to the regime that was brought to existence through such measures. Ancient
Persian holidays that have been practiced for thousands of years are now being shunned
by the government because of the threat that such events pose to the regime. Basiji forces
surround neighborhoods during such holidays to prevent mass gatherings and the
potential for protests. Various women’s groups have been banned by the government.
Reformist based papers and websites have been outlawed. The regime is systematically
attempting to eradicate opposition by breaking down civil society organizations
responsible for endorsing reform. This behavior, however, is causing Islamists of various
backgrounds that once supported the regime to turn their support to reform based political
organizations. The women that once supported the regime for their ties to the leadership
are now questioning the state’s policies. The new educated upper and middle class
segments of society that developed as a result of the revolution are also beginning to
realize that the regime tends to benefit only those closely affiliated with the leadership
apparatus. These people, although provided with opportunities at the start of regime, have
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generally had little allegiance to it because of its inability to financially sustain them as a
new class within the Iranian system. Such class problems were also prevalent prior to the
revolution. Iranians appear to be frustrated with the leaders of the regime for encouraging
cruelty toward those that participate politically to promote reform. Mass arrests,
imprisonments and beatings have led Iranians of varying segments of society to question
the regime’s legitimacy.
If the Islamic regime does not stop religious marginalization and reduce repression, a
revolution will likely occur in the near future. Iranians have clearly grown frustrated with
the system and the religious establishment’s support for the dictatorship that has taken
control of Iran and its people for the last thirty plus years. Iranian leaders will have to
reconsider the way they maintain power because the Iranian masses are no longer willing
to accept the social, political and economic situation in Iran. The likelihood of accepting
a decrease in power however is very slim and because of this, revolution will more than
likely be the method Iranians utilize in order to change the political system. Incremental
changes to the internal structure of the regime may prolong the survival of Iran’s
leadership apparatus, but such changes will probably be insufficient for an oppressed and
largely educated population in need of social and political freedom.
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